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 This Thesis examines the evolution of the Battle of Waterloo from the perspective of both 
British and German historical memory over the course of a century. In popular media, Waterloo 
emerged as a potent symbol for the unity of the nation in both German and British contexts. The 
Thesis’s comparative study of historical memory argues that historical memory is integrally 
related to a society’s development; subsequent generations of Britons and Germans reimagined 
themselves fighting Waterloo in such diverse media as poetry, editorials, popular history, and 
iconography.  
 In the British context, the memory of Waterloo from 1815-1914 was partial to small-scale 
commemorations that reflected expanded notions of Britishness that was more in synch with 
Britain’s political development. This use of a historical memory in effect helped to define what 
was British. The memory of Waterloo was far less straightforward in the case of Germany during 
the same period, where the erratic course of German political evolution stymied efforts to turn 
Waterloo into a national public symbol. Paradoxically, the volatility of German politics only 
served to intensify efforts to shape Waterloo into a national memory because emphasizing a 
German victory over Napoleon in 1815 simplified and obscured the complexities of German 
historical development.  
 All these intertwined strains of memory found themselves at play during the centennial of 
Waterloo in 1915 as intellectuals and artists mobilized memory of Waterloo for the war effort. In 
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this wartime environment, Waterloo became instrumentalized along four interlocking iterations 
in both nations as they used Waterloo to present a case for the legitimacy of their respective war 
efforts. This memory’s failure to predict the course of the First World War ultimately rendered 
Waterloo irrelevant to each society as a master symbol of historical memory. 
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PREFACE  
 Unless noted, all translations are mine. I have elected to keep titles, political parties and 
certain words untranslated in the text. The decision to keep the original German was more than 
stylistic in that some words convey their meaning better in their original tongue than in 
translation. When a German word not in common usage first appears, it will have a parenthesis 
with the proper translation. With regards to German poetry, this study opts for the approach that 
it is better to replicate the meaning of author by a close translation. The result is that it destroys 
much of the poetic meter of the original author. Since the focus of this study is the ideas behind 
depictions of Waterloo, this is an acceptable tradeoff. 
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INTRODUCTION  
THE FLEXIBILITY OF MEMORY 
 One of the most dramatic paintings of the Battle of Waterloo is Lady Elizabeth Butler’s 
Scotland Forever!. Through a clever use of perspective, Butler’s 1881 painting draws the 
viewer’s eye along a charging line of horsemen; the exaggerated poses of both the riders and 
their mounts create a sense of urgent movement as they hurtle towards a focal point. The net 
result is an image that summons up a moment in time: the charge of the Royal Scots Greys on 
the afternoon of 18 June 1815, spoiling Napoleon’s afternoon attack. Butler’s painting was an 
enormous success and became one of the most prominent late-Victorian depictions of the 
Napoleonic Wars. It was a professional and commercial success, garnering Butler a degree of 
fame and being a staple for pictorial advertisements. The painting became so iconic that during 
the opening year of the First World War an anonymous enterprising German artist modified 
Butler’s painting for a frontline New Years greeting card. The charging Scots now became 
German Uhlans through the hasty addition of a Prussian standard. Whereas Scotland Forever! 
gazed towards to the past to extol Britain’s martial heritage, its German plagiarist used the Battle 
of Waterloo to project a victorious future. The Prussians charge under peeling bells and a rayed 
“1915” and inset on the left of the composition a soldier’s family prays for a safe return of their 
soldier in the year to come.1   
 The German use of Butler’s painting is emblematic of how individuals could invoke the 
memory of Waterloo for different ends. The ease with which the1915 postcard transformed a 
British context into a German one reflects a process of gradual cultural diffusion for a century. 
The battle became a potent metaphor within European culture during the nineteenth century. It 
                                                     
1Anonymous, Innigste Neujahrsgrüβe reproduced in Elizabeth Butler, An Autobiography: With 
Illustrations from Sketches by the Author, (London: Constable, 1922), 372.  
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was the subject of numerous paintings, novels, songs, and popular histories meant for mass 
consumption. This cultural process coincided with the emergence of the modern national state, 
so memory of the Battle of Waterloo often had a symbiotic relationship with the state and 
nationalism, extolling and justifying the current order. How Waterloo became such potent mirror 
that reflected contemporary society is the subject of this study. Between 1815 and 1915, the 
battle served as a way for the victors to orientate themselves in this immense time of crisis and 
change.  
  Of the 1815 combatants, Britain and Germany shared the highest degree of common 
experience with Waterloo. Their memories of Waterloo could bask in martial glory of defeat 
because unlike their Dutch-Belgian allies, British and German troops performed well in the fight 
against Napoleon. The French too cultivated a legend of Napoleonic glory, but Waterloo’s 
ignominious end acted against dwelling on this memory. Ernest Meisonnier, the most renowned 
nineteenth-century French painter of Napoleonic subjects, never once depicted Waterloo. In the 
case of Britons and Germans, Waterloo became a dramatic canvas upon which to depict a 
national identity.    
 The emphasis upon the dramatic aspects of the Battle of Waterloo highlights how the 
cultivation of memory is a highly imaginative act. Instead of focusing on the campaign as a 
whole, depictions of Waterloo often utilized a series of separate historical anecdotes that easily 
fit into a grand historical context, such as in the case of the Scots Grey’s charge and Butler’s 
painting. Accordingly, an examination of the historical memory of Waterloo concurs with the 
arguments put forth by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities. In this extended essay on 
the origins of nationalism, Anderson argues that nationalism emerged as a political force with the 
advent of mass literacy. Predominantly middle-class literati created a systematic, albeit fictional, 
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picture of the nation for the reading public. The nation according to Anderson “is imagined as a 
community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, 
the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”2 Media that emphasize the 
dramatic nature of Waterloo suit Anderson’s concept of imagined communities particularly well 
and depictions of Waterloo relied upon extolling the nation united in arms for a common purpose 
under a just hierarchy. Invoking such a community would be useful to orient a nation in a state of 
flux, as was seen in the case of Britain where the memory of Waterloo was most developed and 
institutionalized.  
 While Britain was a highly fractious and divided polity in the century after 1815, the 
Waterloo memory preserved notions of unity of purpose and a sense of Britishness which owed 
its justification through vanquishing a brilliant, but dangerous, foe on behalf of Europe. The 
military aspect of this identity was particularly important to this new iteration of British identity. 
As Linda Colley noted, British identity during the eighteenth century “was superimposed over an 
array of internal differences in response to contact with the Other, and above all in response to 
conflict with the Other.”3 In particular, Colley argued that the century-long battle with Catholic 
France homogenized a large segment of Protestant British culture by giving it both common 
purpose and a common enemy. Not only were these series of wars physical contests between two 
states, but the British Isles’ physical isolation from France ensured this contest would be 
rhetorical as well: the French ideal became the negative mirror upon which to gaze at a 
romanticized British patriotism. This study fuses together both Colley and Anderson’s 
approaches to national identity through a comparative analysis of the constant retellings of this 
particular Napoleonic story in both German and British memory. 
                                                     
2
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), 7, emphasis original. 
3
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 6. 
4 
 
 The comparative German and British context of Waterloo this study draws together much 
of the scholarship on the Napoleonic Wars for both cultures. In the case of British cultural 
history, there is much to build upon. Philip Shaw’s analysis of Waterloo-based literature 
examines the role the battle had upon British Regency culture. Like Colley, Shaw postulates that 
British identity developed in the conflict with France and the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
ushered in a sense crisis among British cultural elites. As Waterloo ended an era, British 
Romanticists such as Scott or Wordsworth tried to reestablish this period by revisiting the 18 
June in triumphant artistic portrayals.4 Although Shaw concludes that this task was ultimately 
quixotic for the Romantics, this study’s examination of less rarified media such as 
advertisements or children’s novels illustrates how this older vision persisted up to 1915. In this 
vein this bears out the conclusions of Elisa Renee Milke’s dissertation on Waterloo and the 
localist state, which argues that consumption of cultural depictions of Waterloo “helped 
transform Waterloo into a national icon and furthermore, it did so over time. Several 
generations…learned to recognize the battle as a key event in Britain’s history because the 
marketplace supplied representations for young people who otherwise had little or no connection 
to 1815.”5 As will be seen in this study, Waterloo became an exercise in the commemoration of 
the British character.   
 The historiography of German memory of Waterloo is considerably more tangled than 
that of its counterpart across the North Sea. This was in no small measure due to the politically-
divided nature of the German states after 1815, which makes it considerably more difficult for a 
historian to speak of a unified “German” memory of 1815, even though one estimate asserts that 
                                                     
4
 Philip Shaw, Waterloo and the Romantic Imagination (Hampshire: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002), 5-6. 
5
 Elisa Renee Milkes, A Battle's Legacy Waterloo in Nineteenth-Century Britain  (PhD diss., Yale 
University, 2002, 2003), 390. 
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a plurality of Wellington’s troops originated from the German-speaking areas.6 Furthermore, 
unlike Britain, Germans experienced direct Napoleonic occupation and rule. Therefore analysis 
of this period consolidates Waterloo with German reaction to the Napoleonic era in general, 
often focusing upon German resistance during the period 1813-15. For example, Christopher 
Clark echoes Shaw through his description of German Romanticists’ use of nonverbal and 
pictorial methods to reassert cultural power after the war ended. In particular, both the Gymnast 
Turner movement and painters such as Caspar David Friedrich adapted the costumes and 
performative acts of the volunteer units that fought against Napoleon to create a non-traditional 
memory.7 Sam Mustafa’s monograph on the German commemoration of Ferdinand von Schill 
also illustrates the plasticity of memory. “Once safely dead,” Mustafa writes of this failed 
martyr, “he always did as he was told. He became a loyal Hohenzollern, a Nazi, a Communist, 
and a liberal, each in turn, as needed.”8 This method of recasting the meaning of the Napoleonic 
experience to fit the jagged complexities of contemporary German history fits into this study’s 
analysis of the German memory of Waterloo. 
 The use of comparative history by this study unifies these two strands of Napoleonic 
historiography. In particular, contrasting German and British visions of 1815 lends insight into 
how national memories develop in multiple ways. This study contends that in times of crisis the 
memories of these two victors often engaged in a loose dialogue with each other through 
addressing the assertions of their titular 1815 ally’s memory of the defeat of Napoleon. At times 
complementary, at times chauvinistic, the memory of Waterloo often had to acknowledge the 
existence of both enemies and allies.   
                                                     
6
 Peter Hofschroer, 1815, The Waterloo Campaign: the German Victory: From Waterloo to the Fall of 
Napoleon (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 339. 
7
 Christopher Clark, “The Wars of Liberation in Prussian Memory: Reflections on the Memorialization of 
War in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany,” The Journal of Modern History. 68, no. 3 (1996): 550-76. 
8
 Sam A. Mustafa, The Long Ride of Major Von Schill: A Journey Through German History and Memory 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), xii. 
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 Such alternating national visions of Waterloo expose the political and cultural 
developments behind the successful cultivation of memory. The sociologist Maurice Halbwachs 
asserted that “collective memory provides the group a self-portrait that unfolds through time, 
since it is an image of the past, and allows the group to recognize itself through the total 
succession of images.”9 Through the repetition of this immobilized past through media, in such 
cases as religious sacramental rituals, Halbwachs demonstrated that a collective memory can 
emerge out of a group of individuals participating in such a ceremony. Building on this concept 
of the collective memory, French historian Pierre Nora developed the concept of a site of 
memory (Lieux de mémoire) in that the past becomes inextricably entangled with the present 
because of collective memory’s importance to identity. For a site of memory to be relevant for 
the present, Nora maintains that collective memory operates with an intricate process of 
inclusion and exclusion of historical details.10  Both theorists of collective memory assert that 
there is a clear distinction between memory and history, with the former being a scientific and 
deliberate reconstruction of the past whereas collective memory is a social process of 
understanding the past.11 In this respect, the memory of Waterloo matches this distinction very 
well through an examination of an imagined battlefield over the longue durée. There is, however, 
one major caveat to the Nora/Halbwach’s approach to collective memory explored in this study: 
however selective memory is, it cannot exist independently from historians. The process of 
explaining the past sets the parameters for the collective memory, thus enabling it to coalesce.  
 By the same token neither did historians during this time period stand apart from the 
collective memory of their society; they were as vulnerable to its biases as their readership. As 
                                                     
9
 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 86. 
10
 Pierre Nora and Lawrence D. Kritzman. Realms of Memory: the Construction of the French Past (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 16. 
11
 Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 80-83, Nora, Realms, 3.  
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history became more professionalized during the nineteenth century, its relationship with the 
state channeled its energies in ways beneficial for the state.12  The history of Waterloo was even 
more susceptible to this process, as it was at its core a military event and success or failure in war 
frequently becomes a nationalist preoccupation. David Lowenthal observed that “histories do not 
merely illustrate or eulogize but explain a people’s special genius.”13 Among both victors at 
Waterloo, historians and memorialists would set out to explain the unique dynamics of their 
national victory over Napoleon. This is particularly apparent in the examples of popular histories 
of Waterloo meant for a broad readership such as those written by W. H. Fitchett in Britain or 
Ferdinand Schmidt’s Gymnasium reader Preussens Geschichte in Wort und Bild. Examining 
these works of popular history bridges the gap between professional and public outlined by Nora 
and Halbwachs by serving as a reminder that historians meant for their works to be read by the 
public. Non-professional exercises in memory also worked parallel to these academics in that 
they used both products of historians and their historical methodology to buttress their arguments 
about the symbolism of Waterloo. Genre painters of Waterloo, for example, often displayed a 
fetishistic fidelity to factual minutia to authentically recreate a moment in time that would 
resonate with their audience. 
 In the case of the two groups most responsible for the 1815 victory over Napoleon, the 
Germans and the British attempted over a century to claim Waterloo as glorious moment in the 
national history. In particular, these memories of Waterloo sought to reaffirm as eternal a 
particular martial identity that originated in the eighteenth-century struggle with France. 
Correspondingly, this strand of historical memory simultaneously expanded and restricted a 
                                                     
12
 For more on this inclination see George G. Iggers, Historiography in the Twentieth Century 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1997), 23-35. 
13
 David Lowenthal, “Identity, Heritage, and History,” in Commemorations: The Politics of National 
Identity, John R. Gillis, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 53, emphasis original. 
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sense of national identity to lines first developed during the earlier periods. As the century drew 
on, the task became to keep Waterloo relevant for a public living in a world that rapidly was 
moving away from the Europe of 1815. This task forced the gatekeepers of memory to be 
increasingly creative and adapt to new media to present a relevant vision of Waterloo for their 
audiences. Therefore this study examines the multiple avenues of memory Waterloo opened up 
for the Germans and the British, such as poems, paintings, fiction, and monuments, as well as 
works of history. The examination of the intersection of history, memory and society is the 
central focus of this study.  
 The master’s thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter One deals with the British memory 
of Waterloo from 1815 to the eve of the First World War.14 This chapter argues that Waterloo 
emerged as a master-symbol for the Victorian Era in the sense that it became an ubiquitous 
presence in British popular culture. The cultivation of a memory cult around the battle occurred 
almost immediately after the battle ended. The British Isles’ proximity to the battlefield, a 
burgeoning print culture, and the fact that a sizable portion of Wellington’s forces was British 
helped to sustain this cult. In addition to drawing upon Colley, the chapter builds upon the 
findings of James Peck and Scott Hughes Myerly who argued that the civilian public saw 
themselves within cultural depictions of the British military.15 The memory of Waterloo 
proceeded along three overlapping stages from 1815-1914, the first extolling late Georgian and 
early-Victorian political order, the second using it as a metric for evaluating Britain’s mid-
century status, and the final stage imagining Waterloo as a essentially British affair extolling an 
idealized vision of contemporary British society.  
                                                     
14
 This chapter builds upon and expands elements of an earlier paper “Waterloo over the Longue Durée: 
The Battle of Waterloo in British Popular Memory.” 
15
 John Peck, War, the Army and Victorian Literature (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998) and Scott 
Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle: From the Napoleonic Wars Through the Crimea (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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 Chapter Two postulates that German cultural commemorations of Waterloo were far 
more complicated than their British counterparts, despite the significant presence of German 
troops on the battlefield. Germans utilized many of the same motifs as their counterparts across 
the North Sea, such as the extolling of martial glory and hero-worship of Marshal Blücher, but 
Germany’s historical development produced important variations in their particular memory cult. 
This chapter broadly asserts that the memory of the Befreiungskriege (Wars of Liberation) of 
1813-15 gradually emerged as a conservative and pro-monarchist memory by 1914.16 Like the 
British memory of 1815-1914, German memory of Waterloo developed along three overlapping 
stages. The first phase involved the invoking of patriotism and German sacrifices between 1813-
15 as a means to forget the proceeding period characterized by humiliation and collaboration 
with the French occupation. In this sense, German memory runs parallel to that of post-Vichy 
France in that sites of memory became a means to overshadow a politically embarrassing history. 
German unification in 1871 was integrally related to the second phase as the German historians 
and intellectuals sought to shape Prussia’s contribution as an important stage in its natural 
development as leader of the German states. The tensions that resulted from this instrumentalized 
use of the past became readily apparent in the third phase as multiple nationalisms used the 
memory of the Napoleonic Wars to celebrate their vision of the German state. This phase came 
to a head during the centennial of the Battle of Leipzig in 1913, which witnessed the intersection 
of state nationalism, populist nationalism, and a German liberal critique of both that harkened 
back to a patriotism celebrated during the first phase of German memory. Since many of the 
dramatis personae of Waterloo such as Blücher or Gneisenau were involved in the Wars of 
Liberation, this chapter also examines media that delved into their role in an earlier period such 
                                                     
16Stefan Berger, Germany (London: Arnold, 2004), 37. 
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as Louise Muhlbach’s Napoleon and Blucher; An Historical Novel, which chronicles 
Blücher’s unique brand of indefatigable resistance to the Napoleonic imperium.   
 Chapter Three shows how the advent of the First World War sharpened and exaggerated 
the memory of Waterloo, as both societies enlisted their history for the war effort. This final 
chapter simultaneously examines both British and German memories of Waterloo under the 
stresses of wartime. In the case of Britain invoking the Battle of Waterloo entailed hitherto 
unexplored vagaries as their ostensible ally in 1815 was now their foe. The German memory of 
Waterloo ironically became more straightforward through an emphasis upon both French 
expansionism and the Britain’s unjust assumption of sole credit for Napoleon’s defeat. Wartime 
mobilization of memory followed four intersecting patterns. The first pattern was one of 
orientation where the historical memory of the past gave comfort for an uncertain future. The 
second pattern was that of hero-worship, where extolling the victors of 1815 was a way to 
simultaneously commend their successors in the trenches. The inverse of this was using 1815 as 
a means to express a narrow chauvinism in which the Napoleonic Era exposes the worst excesses 
of the current enemy. Finally, memory of Waterloo expressed itself in commemorative acts that 
reflected nations trying to understand the full meaning of their history. With the exception of the 
last aspect of memory, the wartime mobilization of memory found very little traction after 1915. 
The inability of First World War One battles to conform to either sides’ narrative that battles 
could be decisive like Waterloo ultimately limited the power of any embellished memory to 
assert itself after the war.    
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Waterloo: The Battle and the Campaign 
 
 This mobilization of memory was made considerably easier by the straightforward nature 
of the events of 18 June 1815.17 The salient features of this battle were even more prominent in 
societies for whom Waterloo was far from a distant memory. This made individuals’ use of 
historical references and imagery a much easier task as their creators did not need to fully 
explain the battle itself. The same cannot be said of today as Waterloo approaches its 
bicentennial. Therefore it is essential to keep the events of 1815 in context to better understand 
better understand the evolution of Waterloo’s memory. The most useful means of doing so is to 
try and distinguish between the Battle of Waterloo and the Waterloo Campaign. 
   Escaping from Elba in March 1815, Napoleon quickly consolidated his hold over France 
in a sudden march on Paris. Assuming once again the title Emperor of the French, the Allied 
powers in Vienna ignored Napoleon’s entreaties for peace. Hoping to forestall another invasion 
of France, Napoleon gathered his most veteran legions and marched to defeat the nearest Allied 
armies: the Duke of Wellington’s Allied Army in Flanders, consisting of British, Dutch and 
German troops, and Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher’s Prussian force on the Rhine. Although 
outnumbered by both armies, Napoleon took advantage of his central position to prevent Blücher 
and Wellington from uniting. Napoleon’s intention was to defeat each army in detail. Although 
Napoleon inflicted a severe reverse upon the Prussians at the town of Ligny on June 16, his 
subordinate Marshal Ney was only able to fight Wellington to a bloody stalemate northwest of 
Ligny in the hamlet of Quatre-Bras that same day. Despite his heavy Allied losses, including the 
                                                     
17
 The number of histories dealing with the Battle of Waterloo is vast. The most modern and up to date 
synthesis of military scholarship on the battle is Jeremy Black’s The Battle of Waterloo (New York: Random House, 
2010). Although first published during the early nineteenth century, William Siborne’s The Waterloo Campaign, 
1815 (Westminster: A. Constable, 1895) still is one of the most thoroughly documented histories of this battle 
utilizing interviews with the battle’s participants. David Chandler’s The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: 
Macmillan, 1966) provides a balanced and modern view of the battle from the opposing sides. Moving more towards 
social history, the chapter on Waterloo in John Keegan’s The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1976) 
represented the battle from the perspective of the common soldier rather than generals.  
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infamous “Black Duke” of Braunschweig-Lüneburg, Frederick William, Quatre-Bras bought 
Wellington time to retreat to the more defensible position along and behind a series of ridges 
southeast of the town of Waterloo. Ahead of these ridges, the Allied army anchored its line 
around three strong points- the stone chateau of Hougoumont, the farmhouse of La Haye Saint, 
and a series of sandpits and defiles. Napoleon, erroneously believing that Blücher was in full 
retreat, sent the bulk of his army against Wellington’s position on June 18. He detailed a corps 
under Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy to pursue Blücher and prevent him from uniting with 
Wellington, but the Prussians evaded Grouchy’s detachment and marched to unite with 
Wellington. Blücher persuaded his subordinates August von Gneisenau and Hans von Ziethen 
that their best option was to march their full force to Wellington. The French attack on 
Wellington’s position came in three waves. Napoleon delayed the first attack by General comte 
D’Erlon’s infantry corps upon La Haye Saint and the defiles because of the rains the night before 
had hampered his deployment of its artillery support. Although this attack made some progress, a 
timely cavalry charge under General Uxbridge fatally disrupted the French effort. Because 
Wellington’s main force was located behind the ridges, Ney confused arriving British 
reinforcements for retreating troops and launched a massive but futile cavalry assault onto 
prepared British and Dutch infantry in the center of Wellington’s line. Napoleon, seeing that his 
two assaults had failed and now under pressure from Blücher’s renewed advance to cut off his 
lines of communication with France, launched one last attack that evening at 7:30 PM. Using his 
only remaining fresh troops, the elite Imperial Guard, he attacked Wellington’s position left of 
the still-defended Hougoumont. Responding to yet another attack, Wellington is reputed to have 
said “O for night to arrive, or Blücher!” Catching fire upon multiple sides from the Anglo-Dutch, 
the hitherto undefeated Guard collapsed, precipitating a French rout from the field. Meeting with 
13 
 
Blücher at the chateau of Belle-Alliance, Wellington did not pursue his defeated foe with the 
rigor advocated by his German ally. Nevertheless the Waterloo campaign was over and 
Napoleon had lost as the dispirited French field army disintegrated.  
 The swift collapse of the French army after its retreat highlights the complex nature of 
the 1815 campaign. It was highly uncharacteristic for armies of the late-Napoleonic period to 
collapse after a single defeat, as evidenced by the swift recovery of the Prussians after Ligny. 
Jeremy Black notes that the political paranoia that followed Napoleon’s return helped precipitate 
an unparalleled collapse among French armies after the Guard’s retreat.18 With the benefit of 
hindsight, Napoleon’s defeat was something of a foregone conclusion. His strategy to retain his 
throne was strategic nonsense; had he defeated both Blücher and Wellington he would have had 
to defeat the even larger Russian and Austrian armies advancing from Germany. Napoleon’s 
grand strategy was roughly analogous to that of Hitler’s invasion of Russia in 1941 in that its 
planning and execution emphasized a series of military victories that were logistically impossible 
to sustain over the long run and had the inadvertent effect of cementing a fractious political 
alliance. Nor was Napoleon’s army in 1815 capable of this ambitious task. Its size was only 
slightly more than a fifth of the 1812 Grand Armee and the French command structure was too 
rigid, especially in comparison to its enemies. In the case of the Prussians, the adaptation of an 
organized general staff system allowed for Prussian army to recuperate from defeat far quicker 
than Napoleon anticipated despite the fact that Blücher suffered injuries at Ligny and was not in 
command for several hours.19 By contrast Napoleon required Grouchy to strictly adhere to his 
vague orders, resulting in the Prussian attack upon Napoleon’s flank in the late afternoon. Yet 
although the problematic nature of Napoleon’s strategy was apparent and became fodder for 
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generations of military historians, this study’s research indicates that the gate-keepers of the 
Waterloo memory would prefer the uncomplicated narrative of the fate of Europe being decided 
in a single day to that of a campaign doomed to a foregone conclusion. As we shall see, the 
events of those June days would run wild in the imaginations of Britons and Germans for a 
century. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
WATERLOO IN BRITISH MEMORY: 1815-1915 
 
I shall not be far wrong in asserting that there exists not in the United Kingdom, man, woman, or 
child, who has not either seen pictures or panoramas of Waterloo, heard songs on Waterloo, read 
books on Waterloo, talked for weeks about Waterloo, and full two-thirds of the adult population 
could not rest until they journeyed forth to have a look at Waterloo.- Harry Austin20  
 
 Thus spoke “Harry Austin” the narrator of the allegedly autobiographical 1838 military 
picaresque novel Guards, Hussars, and Infantry: Adventures of Harry Austin. Representing 
something of an everyman of the British Army; Austin fought with Wellington throughout the 
Spanish Peninsula, observed the titanic battles of Vittoria and Waterloo, and ended his military 
career back in England with his lovely Spanish wife whom Austin rescued from the privations of 
a corrupt nunnery. What was ironic and noteworthy about this novel was that its author does not 
bother to describe the battles that were the denouement of his military service. His account 
instead focused on an archetypical British rogue’s escapades coupled with wry comments on the 
avariciousness of moneylenders and the dandyism of his fellow officers. The above passage 
suggested that within the space of a little over twenty years, the British reading public had been 
so saturated by Waterloo that this anonymous author felt that leaving only the barest description 
of this event would set him apart from his contemporaries. 
 In many respects, the self-effrontery of Guards, Hussars, and Infantry encapsulated the 
dilemmas and opportunities that the memory of the Battle of Waterloo posed to Britons over the 
course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Battle of Waterloo represented the 
climax of British involvement in over twenty years of war with France. The Duke of Wellington 
cemented his already considerable reputation by commanding an army that put an end to 
Napoleon’s brief attempt to return to power. Although Britain’s cumulative contribution to the 
                                                     
20Anonymous, Guards, Hussars and Infantry: Adventures of Harry Austin (London: Saunders and Otley, 
1838), 311. 
16 
 
defeat of Napoleon was on a scale similar to that of her continental allies, the symbolism of 
Wellington’s victory magnified British self-perception of the nation’s preeminence in this 
struggle. As the din and horror of battle faded, Waterloo became an iconic image in British 
popular memory. The status this event enjoyed among Britons as an example of a native martial 
valor and prowess fed the expectation that postwar depictions of Waterloo correspond to those 
ideas. While some authors on the Napoleonic era would eschew this trope, many would end up 
embracing and expanding upon it.  
 This was made easier by the fact that for many in the nineteenth century, the general 
course of Waterloo was very well-known among the British public.  In many respects, Waterloo 
was an unprecedented experience for Regency Era Britain. The nation’s proximity to the Low 
Countries ensured that Waterloo was less of an abstraction to the public than the battlefields in 
the Iberian Peninsula or Mediterranean. The sequential course of the battle, coupled with the 
sudden collapse and retreat of the French imparted an inherent sense of drama to the battle. 
Furthermore, Waterloo was a decisive battle. Years of hard fighting had followed the great 
British victories of Trafalgar in 1805 and Salamanca in 1812, something that was not the case 
with Waterloo. All this made it easier for Britons to attach meaning to the events of June 16-18.  
British writers and artists could glean from Waterloo answers to the larger questions of Britain’s 
place in the world. This utilitarian approach to history mirrored the idea of a usable past 
developed by the American historian James Harvey Robinson. “The present,” wrote Robinson, 
“has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has come when it should turn on the 
past and exploit it in the interests of advance.”21 By calling upon generations of Britons to 
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mentally refight Waterloo, this cultivation of historical memory often attempted to place and 
orientate Victorian and Edwardian eras into a wider current of a glorious past.  
 Yet the militaristic nature of Waterloo ensured that there were limits to this expansion of 
Britishness. By its very nature, the act of extolling Wellington’s Army meant extolling the 
contemporary British Army. The institution was closed off to many in British society, and as the 
century wore on the Army increasingly became the bastion of an aristocratic ethos at odds with 
the industrialized world. Building upon Linda Colley’s thesis, James Peck’s examination of 
Victorian war novels argued that “because of the nature of revolutionary threat Napoleon 
represented, [Victorian novels] reaffirmed the importance of traditional, that is to say 
aristocratic, leadership…and cling on to an aristomilitary code at the very time when Britain was 
changing its social, political, and cultural composition.”22 By the same token, Scott Hughes 
Myerly concluded that this martial ethos expressed through military spectacle represented a way 
for Victorians to acclimate to the machine age by embracing an organization which turned 
individuals into a disciplined machine while retaining a small preindustrial hierarchy at its 
apex.23  An examination of popular depictions of Waterloo supports both historians’ conclusions. 
The memory of Waterloo, especially in literature directed at children, attempted to reaffirm as 
eternal a particular British martial identity that originated in the eighteenth century struggle with 
France. Correspondingly, this strand of historical memory simultaneously expanded and 
restricted a sense of British identity to lines first developed during this earlier period. 
 These multiple imagined Battles of Waterloo had strong implications for the creation of 
British identity during the nineteenth century.  By continuing this essential struggle through 
popular depictions of the Battle of Waterloo, the Victorian and Edwardian gatekeepers of 
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memory ensured that eighteenth- century precepts of Britishness would find new currency. An 
important aspect of this new century-long conflict was that it was in reality fictive. Until 1914, 
Britain only fought small wars and none of them with France. Therefore this sense of British 
identity had more leeway than its eighteenth-century counterpart; it could attempt to incorporate 
a wider array of Britons to include in the national story. The nobility of its enemies could also 
reflect to Britain’s greater benefit.   
 The development of memory of Waterloo evolved along three overlapping phases from 
1815-1914. The first phase, running from roughly 1815 to the 1850s cemented a popular 
narrative of the battle in the consciousness of the British populace, exalting the figure of 
Wellington as a paternalistic savior of the nation from Napoleonic despotism. The 
memorialization of this period saw Britain’s prosperous European position as a natural 
consequence of the efforts of its armies in Flanders. Poems, dioramas and stage productions all 
tapped into this popular current to project a vision of a collective identity gained through war. 
From the 1850s to the 1870s, the memory of Waterloo became more unstable. Britain’s 
preeminence on the continent was no longer as assured as it was earlier, and newspaper editorials 
show how efforts at Waterloo memorialization sometimes met with a more jaundiced eye. Yet 
the importance of this battle meant that there were significant efforts to recast the myth of the 
fight against France into a more universal effort suitable for the new world Britannia found 
herself inhabiting. These efforts paid dividends during the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras, as 
the emerging middle-class culture embraced the ideals of chivalry and militaristic nationalism 
that earlier conceptions of Waterloo had already inculcated. Paintings, new dioramas, and 
children’s literature all contributed to a metamorphosis of Waterloo into a vision that while not 
as anti-French as earlier conceptions, proved to be even more militantly British and hero-
19 
 
worshiping than its predecessor. By the eve of the First World War, Waterloo had become a 
potent cultural metaphor for British life, albeit one divorced from the realities of 1815.  
PHASE ONE: ENGLAND AND VICTORY! 
 News of Napoleon’s defeat caused a sensation in Britain even as the battle itself had just 
ended. The proximity of the Low Countries and Britain’s command of the seas ensured that his 
victory in the field quickly became a cause for national celebration. Wellington’s skills at self-
promotion, honed by years of service in the Peninsula, contributed greatly to the theatrical 
elements of this celebration. On June 21, he sent his aide-de-camp Henry Percy with his dispatch 
along with two captured French eagles. According to one contemporary, after informing 
Downing Street, Percy interrupted a ball “pushing aside everyone who happened to be in his 
way, darting upstairs, into the ballroom, stepping hastily up to the Regent, dropping on one knee, 
laying the flags at his feet, and pronouncing the words ‘Victory, Sir, Victory!”24 Napoleon’s 
abdication and casting himself as Themistocles before the British nation only added to a greater 
sense of British superiority in banishing Napoleon from Europe. 
 In this climate of national euphoria, the British mercantile instinct that Napoleon often 
commented on found itself unchecked. The former emperor’s carriage, captured by Prussian 
troops during the retreat, became the property of the Egyptian Hall in Piccadilly. The proprietor 
of the popular museum, William Bullock, claimed in 1818 that this carriage, along with 
Napoleon’s wardrobe, horses, and his Dutch coachman had in this venue and its travelling 
exhibitions received 110,000 visitors at a schilling a head.25 The panorama painter and 
entrepreneur Henry Aston Barker rushed to the battlefield to gather evidence for an authentic 
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recreation of the battle. He would use this data to construct a massive panorama of the battlefield 
in March 1816 in Leicester Square. The 360-degree painting revolved around a central platform 
and offered the London crowds an authentic Waterloo experience through the use of stage 
lighting and movement of the canvas. Barker’s panorama, like Napoleon’s carriage, proved an 
immense draw for British crowds, netting its proprietor a profit of over £10,000 within a few 
months.26 The presence of a rival panorama on the Strand did not hurt Barker’s profits, and he 
was able to amass a considerable fortune from ticket sales and commemorative pamphlets and 
etchings.27These panoramas and popular amusements became an inexpensive way for Britons to 
participate in national celebration. For those with greater financial means, the battlefield itself 
became one of the top destinations for British tourists. The Belgians cleared the battle’s detritus 
while shaping the landscape to better suit the expectations of its visitors. For example, within a 
year of the battle, the locals had erected forty-foot tall wooden scaffold at the French position to 
observe the battlefield from the perspective of Napoleon.28 Locals sold relics of the battle 
ranging from spent cannonballs to leftover remains of soldiers’ kits, such as broken muskets or 
boots. On a more grisly level, the teeth of so many dead young men allegedly became a boon for 
nineteenth-century dentists and the moniker “Waterloo Teeth” entered into popular vocabulary 
for natural dentures.29 The Romantic poet Walter Scott was also among the many tourists who 
visited the site in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Although the resulting poem 1815 “The 
Field of Waterloo” was one of many poems celebrating Wellington’s victory that year, Scott’s 
poem was particularly salient in that it addressed the theme of exactly how future generations 
should approach the memory of this epochal battle.  
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 Scott approached Waterloo from the perspective of a British Romantic in that he saw that 
the closest analogy humans could have of the death and suffering was the natural landscape. 
Noting the farmland surrounding the fields juxtaposed with the shattered spires of Hougoumont, 
he mused: 
 Than that which peasant's scythe demands, 
 Was gathered in by sterner hands, 
   With bayonet, blade, and spear. 
 No vulgar crop was theirs to reap, 
 No stinted harvest thin and cheap! 
 Heroes before each fatal sweep 
   Fell thick as ripened grain30 
 
These human sheaves of grain found themselves between the goals of two giant forces of will: 
Napoleon and Wellington. Like his Romantic contemporary Benjamin Robert Haydon, the two 
commanders are analogous in their superhuman abilities; Wellington happened to be a more pure 
form of the Napoleonic genius shorn of its overweening ambition. Scott’s Napoleon emerges as 
an active force of nature, ordering his men to repeatedly charge, and Wellington’s task is to use 
his sublime powers of command to inspire his men to resist this onslaught: 
 But HE [Wellington], his country's sword and shield, 
 Still in the battle-front revealed, 
 Where danger fiercest swept the field, 
   Came like a beam of light, 
 In action prompt, in sentence brief - 
 “Soldiers, stand firm!” exclaimed the Chief, 
   “England shall tell the fight!”31 
 
Semmel notes the battlefield itself became for Scott a living embodiment of memory of this 
struggle of men against the world; the tree under which Wellington had his command post 
became especially significant.32 The gradual absorption of the human relics of the battlefield 
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paralleled that of previous empires such as Greece or Rome. Thus by combining all these factors, 
Waterloo became one of the most illustrious in the pantheon of British military victories: 
 In many a field of bloody conquest known, 
  --Such may by fame be lured, by gold be hired: 
   ‘Tis constancy in the good cause alone 
 Best justifies the deed thy valiant sons have won.33 
 
Britain’s magnanimity in victory, the nobleness of the Duke of Wellington, and the ease at which 
British troops were able to translate their commander’s will clearly indicate to the reader what 
type of bloody field the one in Belgium has become.  
 Although lacking the subtlety of Scott’s other poetry, “The Field of Waterloo” proved to 
be a respectable seller, going into the third edition three months after its October publication. 
Although few in this first cohort of the memory cult of Waterloo would go as far as Scott in his 
Romanticist elitism, the core values of Britain’s noble sacrifice and Wellington’s native genius 
were apparent in other, more plebian, Waterloo entertainments. One of the most prominent of 
these was the equestrian show The Battle of Waterloo performed at Astley’s Amphitheater in 
1824. The show ran for 144 consecutive performances, the whole season, and Wellington 
attended not once, but twice.34 
 Combining bare-bones theater with what would later be the forerunner of the modern 
circus, Astley’s Amphitheater originated from the efforts of a father and son British cavalry 
veterans: Philip Astley senior and junior. During the Napoleonic Wars, Astley’s performed 
numerous reenactments of land and naval battles such as Trafalgar or the storming of the 
Bastille. The plays themselves were often simplistic morality tales, but with performed with 
pomp and a claim for the highest historical fidelity. According to Gillian Russell’s examination 
of popular entertainments like Astley’s, “people attended not because their entertainments were 
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more or less theatrical but because theater, like the camp and the parade ground, created the 
desire to see war.”35  
 The play, written by J. H. Amherst, examined Waterloo from the perspectives of the 
leadership and the rank and file from both sides. Although Napoleon comes across as a man of 
destiny and nobility, he cannot persuade a captured British trooper, Corporal Standfast, to betray 
his King. Touched by his loyalty, he rewards this corporal with his liberty and a star from his 
own jacket. The French ranker, a Monsieur Maladroit does not have the same courage as 
Standfast. In the second scene, Maladroit, a French deserter in Ligny hints at the future betrayal 
of his Emperor to two Belgian girls: When de French speak to me, I say, ‘Long live the 
Emperor!’ and when de English do speak to me, I sing out ‘God save Great George our King!’36 
Standfast, his liberty given by Napoleon, still has important papers about the French disposition 
to give to Wellington, but was captured by Antoine. Molly Maloney, a female Irish camp 
follower rescued Standfast and reunited him with his love, Mary. The last dialogue of the play 
was Wellington and his staff mounting their chargers, crying “Now, gentlemen let’s on the field, 
and share all the danger: for the honour of England, we must be resolute, and noble cry-‘England 
and Victory!’”37 The stage directions ended with a full battle, instructing Napoleon, for all his 
earlier magnanimity, to beat a hasty retreat right after Molly entered the fray with her own 
pistols.   
 The Battle of Waterloo attracted widespread praise during its first run. According to the 
Drama or Theatrical Pocket Magazine, the production was “gargantuan in everything except 
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dullness.”38 The Times praised the equestrian horsemanship. “The horses of the cavalry behaved 
quite as well as if they had been in the fight with their riders,” according to its reviewer.39 Just as 
in Scott’s epic poem, the martial glory of Waterloo shared an innate connection with the 
authenticity and prowess of the British character, as exemplified by men such as Standfast and 
Wellington. The attention to historical fidelity, advertised by the Astleys and noted by the Times’ 
review, had less to do with The Battle of Waterloo’s plausibility than with the fact that it fed into 
what was fast becoming the accepted memory of Waterloo among the British public. Too much 
attention to historical fidelity could prove hazardous for those who worked against the grain of 
the Waterloo memory, as would be the case in William Siborne’s model.  
 In 1830, acting on behalf of the government, Major-General Rowland Hill contracted 
Siborne, a trained topographical surveyor in the British Army, to construct an accurate model of 
Napoleon’s third attack of the day for the United Service Museum. Siborne was a highly 
meticulous researcher and spent several months in Belgium surveying the battlefield to produce 
an accurate scale of the land’s topography. Being conversant in German, he also solicited 
accounts of the battle from Prussian sources as well as many of the surviving British and French 
officers. The result was a diorama of the battle as Siborne conceived of it at 7:00 PM, with the 
Imperial Guard bearing down upon Wellington’s position while a sizable Guard detachment 
defended Napoleon’s rear against Blücher’s advancing Prussians. Measuring 21 x 19 feet the 
diorama contained 80,000 10 mm French, British, and Prussian figurines, each representing two 
individual soldiers.40 Siborne had since incurred significant debts researching and constructing 
the model as the new Whig government had withdrawn the support for a project that would 
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enhance the prestige of the leader of the rival Tories. More importantly, Siborne’s recreation had 
called into question the authenticity of Wellington’s original June dispatch which had 
downplayed the Prussian contribution to this moment of crisis. Upon its exhibition in Egyptian 
Hall, Wellington refused to visit the Siborne’s creation. In a letter to Lady Wilton, he justified 
his absence, “I was unwilling to give any sanction to the truth of such representation in this 
Model, which must have resulted in my visiting it, without protesting such erroneous 
representation.”41 In addition to his debts, Siborne now found himself the object of institutional 
hostility in British Army institutions such as the United Service Journal and found his military 
career had stalled.  
 Siborne’s case illustrates one of the fundamental characteristics of the politics of 
memory: that history serves mythology rather than the other way around. Siborne’s professional 
career ended despite the fact that the model won wide praise. The Times raved the Siborne had 
“has executed his task with great accuracy, and presented the public a plan of the great event of 
the day which will convey a better notion than a mere map or the reading a mere account without 
auxiliary explanation.”42 Yet Siborne’s quest for historical accuracy had tread upon those who 
were the prime beneficiaries of this memory. Wellington had no problem with the inaccuracies 
of Astley’s The Battle of Waterloo, but Siborne’s model undercut his position as the sole victor 
over Napoleon during the assault of the Guard. This put an interesting twist upon Patrick J. 
Geary’s suggestion that once scholarly premises have been “projected onto [a] period have been 
accepted, political leaders can draw out policy implications to suit their political agenda.”43 In 
this case, Wellington, as the author of the dispatches from the battlefield, helped lay out the 
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foundation of the British perceptions of Waterloo. This memory’s tap into a primal form of 
British identity ensured that he could use public memory to gain political power. However the 
image of Wellington and Waterloo as paragons of British military supremacy and virtue had 
potential liabilities, especially for British conservative Tories. When British militia troops 
attacked a Manchester radical protest at St. Peter’s Field on 16 August 1819, killing 15, the 
radical press was able to use the memory of Waterloo against the conservative Liverpool 
government by calling the event the Peterloo Massacre. Labor historian E. P. Thompson noted 
that Peterloo energized a moribund political radicalism that had been cowed by censorship and 
post-1815 patriotism.44 Wellington’s public stature ensured he would be a de facto symbol for 
the Tory party, but his tenure as prime minister from1828-30 was far from popular, especially as 
Irish political agitation forced him to accede to Catholic Emancipation. The Duke’s military-
style leadership and inexperience with politics ensured that his partnership with the political head 
of the Tories, Robert Peel, was less than ideal. His unpopularity reached a nadir when in the 
summer of 1832, a radical London crowd assaulted this symbol of the “Old Corruption” due to 
his party’s opposition to political reform.45 Although he assumed near-dictatorial powers as the 
head of a Conservative caretaker government in 1834, his underwhelming political fortunes 
meant that it was only after Wellington’s gradual removal from active party life could the Tories 
fully capitalize on the memory of Waterloo by returning him to the status of a symbol of the 
conservative nation. 
 In the case of local Tory clubs Waterloo Day became a date to affirm loyalty to the crown 
and to rally conservatives after the political setbacks of the 1820s and 30s. Milkes notes that 
local Tory festivals and banquets on the anniversary of Waterloo emerged as an important part of 
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the calendar of conservative counter-demonstrations to radical dining groups.46 Waterloo became 
a potent symbol in Tory associational life as exemplified in the 1837 song “The Hero of a 
Hundred Fights” reprinted in the Tory newspaper The Derby Mercury.  Meant to carry 
“Conservatism to the piano-fortes and harps of our fair countrywomen” the song extols 
Wellington’s victories spanning from India to Waterloo as a symbol of Old England: 
 The Champion of Old England’s fame,  
 The Hero of a hundred fights! 
 How oft along the swelling waves, 
 When many a well-fought field was won, 
 Hath Triumph borne the self-same song 
 Of Victory and Wellington! 
 Fill high the cup to him whose sword 
 For years maintain’d his country’s rights-47 
 
In this case Wellington and Waterloo represented England’s past glories, Peel and the current 
Tory leadership represented the road to future prosperity. Underneath the Derby Mercury’s ode 
to Wellington is a song extolling Peel, “England’s Hope, or With Peel For Our Pilot”, in which 
the author claims to express “the feeling of the hero of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington 
himself, when saying that the subject of the next song is truly England’s hope.”48 Engaging in 
this language of patriotism, the Tories claimed Waterloo’s place in British politics for 
themselves. An 1835 article in Blackwood’s Magazine used Waterloo celebrations to impugn the 
patriotism of the publication’s Whig opponents.  “Of all days in the year most hateful to the 
Whigs is the 18th of June,” the editorial claimed. It then listed a variety of stock arguments 
Whigs allegedly used to strip Wellington of his military glory, such as his needing to have the 
Prussians save his army.49 This denial of Britain’s glory was in stark contrast to an Edinburgh 
Tory Waterloo banquet, where its chairman extolled Wellington as the bringer of peace and 
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freedom to both Britain and the continent. Referencing Wellington’s assumption of all executive 
positions in 1834, the chairman asserted: 
 Although his tenure of office was short, it was successful in removing some of the 
 prejudices which had been instilled into the mind s of the people—in demonstrating to 
 them, that the opinions and principles which he advocated were not only not incompatible 
 with liberal government, but were essential to preservation, and in reminding them of 
 what was in danger of being forgotten, namely, the vast importance of sincerity and 
 integrity as ingredients in the character of public men.50 
 
In these above cases demonstrate how during a time of British political definition the memory of 
Waterloo became enfolded into the new vocabulary of the British right. 
 This politically-orientated reading of Waterloo was not the only way the British 
government celebrated the battle. Milkes observes that Whig newspapers covering the Tory 
banquets decried conservatives’ monopolization of Waterloo, which they asserted was a national 
victory.51 The Waterloo Medal bolstered such an opinion. Cast from silver, the medal featured a 
portrait of the Prince Regent on one side and a Goddess of Victory between the words 
“Wellington” and “Waterloo” on its back. A novelty of the item was that the recipient of the 
medal had his name, rank, and regiment embossed by machine on the medal’s edges.52 In an 
unprecedented move, all soldiers, regardless of rank, were eligible to receive this medal provided 
that they served the British Army in any capacity in Flanders from 16-18 June 1815. The 
decision to commemorate only Waterloo rankled many British Army veterans who did not serve 
in Waterloo, leading eventually to the establishment of a silver General Service Medal for all 
participants in the war from 1793-1814, with clasps to signify other major battles. These medals 
signified the start of an important aspect of Waterloo, the commemoration of the common 
soldier. Previous parliamentary medals and awards only celebrated the commanders, but now 
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government praised the sacrifices and services of all British subjects in service to the crown, a 
process that would continue into the modern British Army.  
 Another way Parliament showed its new commitment to the ordinary soldiers was 
through its commission of Daniel Maclise’s painting The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher.53 
Measuring twelve feet high and forty-six feet long, this fresco adorned the Royal Gallery of the 
newly-rebuilt Hoses of Parliament in 1861. Like previous paintings of Wellington and Waterloo, 
such as George Jones’s The Battle of Waterloo, Maclise’s fresco placed Wellington at the 
composition’s focal point. However, surrounding the two generals is a charnel house of death 
and destruction. Wellington grasps Blücher’s hand, but neither commander seems jubilant over 
their victory over Napoleon. Religious imagery abounds in the fresco; several men grasp at 
crucifixes, and in one poignant episode to the right of Wellington, three soldiers recreate a pieta. 
In the latter case, political symbolism abounds, the dead soldier was Frederick Howard, a soldier 
eulogized by Byron in his poem ‘Childe Harold”, and his companions wear the uniforms of an 
English Foots Guard, a Scots Highlander, and an Irish Fusilier. In this way British culture fused 
with British politics, elevating the scene of death into one of collective sacrifice from all 
components of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the sober painting’s depiction of death 
highlighted that at the mid-nineteenth century as the original participants of Waterloo started to 
die off. The surrealist atmosphere could only be expected as generations with no experience of 
the Napoleonic Wars tried to depict their ultimate meaning. 
 
PHASE TWO: NOTHING WHICHYOUNGER GENERATIONS NEED BE AT PAINS TO 
COMMEMORATE  
 
 In 1846, London authorities installed the largest equestrian statue in Britain on Hyde Park  
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Corner. Measuring 30 feet high, 26 feet long, and 22 feet in girth, the statue was of Wellington 
and his Waterloo horse, Copenhagen. Many, including Queen Victoria, considered this bronze 
statue to be an eyesore.54 As the city of London expanded, the London authorities eventually 
removed the statue to the Aldershot Military Town in 1883. Punch, the leading satirical journal 
of the Victorian age, sensed an obvious opportunity, and published a satire entitled “The Poor 
Duke (A Legend of Hyde Park and Piccadilly)” in which the specter of the deceased Duke 
wanders the streets London. Confronting a policeman outside the former Astley’s, Wellington’s 
ghost inquired: 
 “Well, and how did the Battle go last night?” 
 “What Battle, Sir?” asked the policeman. 
 “Why, ‘The Battle of Waterloo.’ Surely they played it?” 
 “Played it!” replied the custodian of the law. “Why-Sir, they haven’t played that for the 
 last twenty years or more! Why it’s almost forgotten.”55 
 
After failing to receive comfort from other statued luminaries such as John Stuart Mill or George 
IV, Wellington and his steed drowned themselves in the bed of the Serpentine. Aside from its 
acerbity, Punch’s lampoon was notable for how it revealed the tensions latent in remembering 
Waterloo as 1815 became more remote. Through monuments and commemorations, the Battle of 
Waterloo might be present among the British public, but its memory would have to have to be 
recast to reflect a new form of identity to retain its relevance in a changed world.  
 The Times was one of the first to note how the heroic mode of Scott and Amherst was 
inapplicable to the world of 1865. In a June 27 editorial, the author asserted that the results of 
Waterloo were very meager. “The treaties which followed [Waterloo] have been torn to shreds,” 
the editorial stress, “and more remains of the Thirty Years’ War than of the Waterloo campaign. 
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The restored Bourbons were driven out of France again, twice over. The proscribed dynasty 
came back again, and reigns now.”56 Applying a counterfactual revisionism, The Times’s author 
concluded that Louis Napoleon’s Empire reflected the type of empire his uncle would have 
created had he been more predisposed to negotiation in 1815. In a reversal of the earlier patriotic 
memory, it concluded: 
  The ideas -which [Napoleon] represented survived; the dynasty which he founded rose 
 again and the ruins on which his throne had been raised it was found beyond our power to 
 reconstruct. Under such circumstances, we think the celebration of Waterloo might as 
 well be discontinued. The victory was a splendid military achievement, but the policy 
 which the war expressed was no enduring or successful policy. The battle was a battle 
 which soldiers may well remember but it decided nothing which younger generations 
 need be at the pains to commemorate.57 
 
Two years later, Punch would offer a similar sentiment about the meager results of 1815 for the 
present day in “Two Eighteenths of June.” Noting that the Austro-Prussian War began on the 
anniversary of Waterloo, Punch connected the more illustrious efforts of Britain’s 1815 
forbearers with its Palmerston-counterpart: 
  Holy Alliance! Then we saw 
  Prussian, Russian, and Austrian combine O'er Europe’s war-blurred map to draw 
 The measuring-tape and marking-line. France crush’d, and revolution done, 
  And peoples taught they can't be free— ‘Tis strange, when vultures are at one, 
 How wonderfully they agree! 
  Now, see this goodly work unpick’d— 
 Holy Alliance drawing swords! Eighteen-fifteen’s arrangements kicked 
  To shivers by its sovereign lords: Napoleon's forfeit name, once more, 
 Symbol of European power, France at peace, arbiter of war. 
  The Emperor master of the hour! 
 And England folding brawny hands, 
  And looking on with even heart, As one who by a quarrel stands, 
 With neither brawler taking part— Oh, startling difference in the tune58 
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Some British intellectuals would try to understand French defeat in 1870-71 in the context of a 
repeat of Waterloo. For example, an 1870 Birmingham Daily Post review of a pro-Napoleon 
French book on Waterloo argued that the numbers decided the 1815 battle, a lesson that 
Wellington knew but neither Napoleon nor his nephew truly understood. The inability of the 
French to grasp this meant that in both cases “there was some strange miscalculations on the part 
of the French Marshals, the same underrating of the enemy forces, and still more of his prudent 
intelligence.”59 Despite this comfort of history’s repetition, it was clear that the German Wars of 
Unification ushered in a new form of industrial conflict quite unlike that of Napoleonic Era. 
 The above cases suggested that the previous memory of Waterloo could no longer be 
plausible; whatever the sacrifices of its arms and the genius of its commander, it could not be 
said that it created a tangible and permanent settlement upon the continent. Yet Waterloo 
remained too much of an iconic image in British culture for it to remain fallow. Furthermore, 
Britain had suffered a string of imperial setbacks in the mid-nineteenth century such as the Sepoy 
Mutiny of 1857-59, which nearly ended British rule over India, and the Crimean War of 1853-
56, which exposed to the British public the detrimental effects that an unreformed Napoleonic 
Era army such as the purchase of commissions could have on a modern battlefield. These blows 
underscored the need of a positive memory. The solution was for the meaning of Waterloo to be 
applied to a wider concept of British identity that was more congruent with the new nationalist 
Europe.  
 One way in which this occurred was by incorporating Waterloo as an exemplar of what 
Peck referred to as “Christian Militarism” in which “the military code of the Wellington era had 
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been refashioned into a moral and religious cause.”60 The articulation of this ideology had started 
in the late 1840s amid the last remnants of the Wellington-centered memory cult but received a 
dynamic boost with the advent of mass media depictions of British troops during the Crimean 
War. Olive Anderson’s analysis notes that the Crimean War allowed the British middle classes to 
see their army as a People’s Army reflecting their beliefs and values.61 Christian militarism also 
entailed a militarization of middle class society as middle class institutions such as political 
reform and missionaries adapted a martial regimen emphasizing hierarchy in the service of God.  
 In this ethos, the Waterloo men and Wellington were exemplars of the Christian soldier 
acting in conscience against a vague tyranny. Composed on the Duke’s death in 1852 by the Scot 
and staunch British nationalist, Charles Mackay’s song “A Dirge for Wellington” memorialized 
a figure of divine justice and protection was typical of this. The Duke was: 
  Shield of our laws !  
 Ever in peril's night  
 Heaven send such arm of might—  
 Guardian of Truth and Right,—  
  Raised in their cause!62  
 
By the same token, the British officer, amateur geologist, and poet Thomas Austin would extol 
many of those same martial virtues discernable in the ordinary ranks of the Duke’s men. 
Assuming the voice of one of the units, his poem “Waterloo: The Life Guardsmen’s Song” 
declared: 
 We pause not even to draw breath.  
 Thus we fight for England's fame,  
 For home, and all that hear our name,  
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 For every tie that love may claim,  
   Even to death.63 
 
Austin further empathized with the Waterloo veterans in his anonymous hero of “The Chelsea 
Pensioner” whom had left “half his limbs in Flanders or Spain” and urged his reader to: 
 Go see him on Sunday at church in his place,  
 Where he prays at the altar in hopes to find grace,  
 His God has his first thought, his sovereign the next,  
 As his chaplain expounds the bless’d words of his text,  
 Which bring peace to his bosom, and hope to his soul,  
 As he thinks of the future, and looks to that goal  
 Where his cares, and his sorrows, and trials, will cease,  
 And his spirit inherit bless’d mansions of peace.64 
 
In these two poems, there is no substantial difference between the stalwart warriors of 
Wellington’s legions and the pious pensioner at prayer; in either case the soldier attends to his  
duties with a mixture of determination and patriotism under the direction of a benevolent leader.  
 The most extreme vision of this worship of Wellington as a Christian soldier can be 
found in the 1861 article “Wellington’s Career” in the Anglican evangelical periodical The 
Christian Observer. Ostensibly a review of Edward Bruce Hamley’s Wellington's Career: a 
Military and Political Summary, the author argued that Hamley’s historical critiques of 
Wellington misread the divine providence evident in Wellington’s career. According to the 
reviewer “there is scarcely such another instance in the page of history of a man especially raised 
up, created, fitted, educated, and then placed in the exact sphere and department for which he had 
been prepared…that the Unseen Hand seems to come visibly forth, like the hand which wrote on 
the wall of Belshazzar's palace.”65 The reviewer proceeded to demonstrate that at every stage of 
Wellington’s military career he was out-numbered by superior forces, but providence assured his 
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victories. In the case of Waterloo, “Wellington’s Career” contended that Wellington was 
outnumbered through a complicated arithmetic in which a Prussian or Dutch soldier’s combat 
abilities only equaled half that of a British or French soldier.66 In this estimation, the arrival of 
the Prussians in the afternoon of the battle was irrelevant in that they were a nugatory force 
unequal to either the French or the British.  
 The article circumvented issues of Wellington’s complicity in the abuses of his troops 
after the siege of Badajoz by drawing equivalencies to the actions of the Israelites in the Old 
Testament. “Wellington’s Career” concluded by expanding this metaphor further by arguing that 
Wellington’s postwar controversies were like the mistakes committed by Solomon. Peel 
unscrupulously manipulated Wellington into backing Catholic Emancipation and the Duke also 
bore the brunt of negative criticism from the necessary opposition to political reform because of 
the Peel’s machinations.67 In this instance, the honest, divinely-ordained soldier became the 
cat’s-paw of venal and corrupt politician whose only goal was political power.  
 A Christian militarist interpretation of the memory of Waterloo was clearly invoked also 
in Waterloo, A Lay of Jubilee by William Selwyn. In contrast to the jubilee editorial in The 
Times, which advocated that Waterloo’s commemoration be forgotten due to Europe’s current 
political situation, this epic lay by Queen Victoria’s personal chaplain saw Waterloo as a 
universal Christian allegory. The moments of the battle were presented as a repeats of biblical 
episodes. The defenders of Hougoumont’s chateau endured their own fiery furnace, and 
Napoleon’s army was the new army of Pharaoh approaching a Redcoat sea.68 
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 For Selwyn, Waterloo represented a particularly prominent example of when the whole 
of the United Kingdom faced a challenge with a united front. Uxbridge’s afternoon cavalry 
charge, consisting of the English Royals, the Scottish Greys, and the Irish Inniskillings and in 
“their Union charged the Kingdoms three.”69 The sacrifice and devotion of each nation in turn 
received due praise from Selwyn. Picton, the Welsh-born general who died repulsing D’Erlon’s 
advance, transformed an emblematic example of national sacrifice:  
 His men will still rush on, and evermore 
 Remember him, when battle rages fierce;  
 And deem they hear his rough but hearty cheer,  
 ‘Come on! brave ragged rascals.’ He is fall’n; 
  Fall’n—but to rise again in after wars,  
 In many a soldier from the hills of Wales;  
 Who knowing how he lived, and how he died,  
 Will gladly yield up life for victory.70 
 
Waterloo thus conveyed both unity and certainty for contemporary Britons. Building upon the 
Wellington-centered hero worship of the earlier period, the Duke, while mourning the dead, 
thanks God for the desired result.71 By using the memory of Waterloo to reflect an ideal polity, 
Britain’s unity metaphorically emerged from the experience of battle. All present-day Britons 
needed to do was trust God and their monarch, and the success of Waterloo would repeat itself.  
 This second iteration of the Waterloo reinforced the notion that the battle represented an 
extreme example of an essential British character under fire. This Britishness was united and 
capable of heroic feats when under proper leadership. As The Times and Punch pieces indicated, 
a strict historical interpretation of Waterloo could only maintain only the most tenuous 
connections to relevance in the industrial and national age. The Vienna Settlement that Waterloo 
secured was a dead letter in Europe by 1871. Yet if the memory cult surrounding Waterloo 
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retreated into an imagined reverie of martial glory, then it allowed Britons to adapt this particular 
“lesson” of history towards any end. The final stanzas of Selwyn’s lay indicated the flexibility 
inherent to this approach. Referencing the Franco-British cooperation during the Crimean War, 
he concluded: 
    And when the peace was broken, 
 those who fought The fight of giants on that awful day,  
 With equal daring, but unequal end, 
  Were found in arms, and conquering, side by side,  
 Against the strong oppressor of the weak.72 
 
By the same token, The Times ahistorically observed that during the consecration of a new 
Belgian cemetery and memorial in 1890 that Belgium “profited as largely as Great Britain by 
British sacrifices, and has known how to use them to its permanent advantage. In the national 
developments, which unless for Waterloo would have been forever unattainable, it has cultivated 
the example of England, and has framed its institutions on English models.”73 The Belgians, 
despite their Orleanist-influenced constitution, become analogous to Britons by maintaining the 
memory of Waterloo through the monuments of this quintessentially British battlefield.    
PHASE THREE: TO RENEW IN POPULAR MEMORY THE GREAT TRADITIONS OF THE 
IMPRIAL RACE TO WHICH WE BELONG 
 
 This retreat into imagination allowed Waterloo to enter into the twentieth century as a 
potent symbol for Britain’s power. By asserting that it was the historical battle itself that 
confirmed British identity, the popular memory of Waterloo could emerge independent of the 
cause itself. Therefore, British writers could empathize with their French foes to a much greater 
extent than before in that this imagined enterprise was a purely British conception. The desire for 
imperial unity, as expressed in Selwyn’s poem, became stronger as Scots, Welsh, Irish, and 
English united in a martial crusade. Such a sense of purpose and unity would be useful in the 
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sustaining the expansive imperial project late Victorians had inherited. Wellington remained an 
object of veneration and hero-worship, but the distinctions between the Duke and his soldiers 
was less well-defined in the art and literature this period.  
 One of the more spectacular uses of Waterloo in this period was an 1889 advertising 
campaign for Eno’s Fruit Salts, a popular sodium bicarbonate antacid. In a series of bold 
columns, the ad asked its viewers in large type: 
 Is the Fall of England’s Greatness Near At Hand? 
  Wellington at Waterloo! 
  What was Wellington’s ideal of this life? 
 To dare nobly, To live strongly, and never Hesitate in the sublime devotion to DUTY!  
 When Wellington rode into his infantry squares at Waterloo, as the diminished numbers 
 closed up to receive a charge of French cavalry, he said to his men “Stand steady, lads; 
 think of what they will say of us in England;” to which they replied “Never fear, Sir.”74 
 
In even smaller print, the ad claims that a man has no higher duty than to conquer pain; hence the 
need for Eno’s scientifically-derived antacids to conquer indigestion.  
 Aside from its absurd analogies and sensationalism, the Eno’s ad was notable for the way 
it illustrated how Waterloo had so permeated British culture that it became a stock symbol. The 
ad further shows how such a loose reading Waterloo seamlessly fit into the British Empire. At 
the ad’s bottom, smaller print informed the reader how Eno’s helped a regiment win the Battle of 
Kandahar during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). According to the testimony of a 
British cavalry ranker, his regiment’s colonel gave his men a bottle of Eno’s before the battle, 
giving them a restful sleep. Bookending these two experiences in the advertisement drew the 
explicit connection that the modern British Army resembled the one of Wellington’s through its 
just hierarchy and devotion to duty. Rather than taking an antacid to ease stomach pain, the 
individual target of the Eno’s ad would vicariously recreate those moments in British history.    
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 The painting Scotland Forever! by Elizabeth Thompson Butler exemplified this trend 
towards a focus upon an individual’s experience in the titanic struggle within a British collective 
mindset, albeit less histrionically. Butler’s painting was a notable success of the 1881 season and 
established her reputation as a premier painter in this genre. Based upon the Scottish Greys’ 
cavalry unit during Uxbridge’s charge, the canvas, exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1881, 
depicts a line of Scottish horse charging straight at the viewer. Through a skillful use of 
perspective, Butler’s painting drew the eye along a set path, creating a unified linear 
composition. The slightly exaggerated poses gave the painting a sense of swift movement. As 
Punch’s positive but typically caustic review mused, “our gallant troopers are charging so 
heavily that you might almost mistake them for so many Scotch hotelkeepers attacking a body of 
tourists from the South.”75 Like her previous paintings on the Crimean War, her battle 
compositions had as their subject the common soldier. This was a marked contrast to other, 
earlier battle portraits which often had a commander at its focal point. “I never painted for the 
glory of war,” Butler asserted in her autobiography, “but to portray its pathos and heroism.”76 By 
eschewing death though Butler’s paintings make the glory of war indistinguishable from its 
heroism. In doing so, she tapped into the larger late Victorian middle-class attitudes towards war 
and the military. Although composed of men from the lower orders of society, the military’s 
innate hierarchy and wartime experience drained the military of any baleful influence of its class 
origins. As J. W. M. Hichberger has noted, this rhetorical symbiosis between the soldier and his 
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corporate identity of his unit “could be used to simultaneously deify and dehumanize the men.”77 
Butler’s virtuosity in this genre only accentuated this connection between heroism and glory.  
 Although Butler publically eschewed the connection between heroism and martial glory, 
the emerging genre of children’s literature made no such claims. Looking through a survey of 
children’s adventure books, J. S. Bratton notices “that the overwhelming surface impression is 
that a blatant reiteration of racial pride, militaristic values, and a coarse enthusiasm for conquest 
characterizes serialized adventure stories.”78 Imbued with the ethos of the nationalistic public 
school environment, these books often placed Britain’s current prosperity as the natural 
byproduct of the heroic sacrifices of her military. 
 The 1870 inaugural issue of Beeton’s Own Magazine: An Illustrated Journal of Fact, 
Fiction, History, and Adventure has elements that confirmed Bratton’s observations. Priced and 
marketed directly at children, the first issue had a truncated reproduction of Maclise’s The 
Meeting of Wellington and Blücher along with an accompanying poem.79 Whereas the original 
painting emphasized death and destruction, the Beeton’s lithograph sanitized the composition by 
removing all of Maclise’s corpses. The stoic emotions of the commanders are a reflection of 
allied teamwork rather than a reaction to carnage. The accompanying poem “The Meeting of 
Wellington and Blücher” likened war into a sports match. It starts off with an allusion to the 
empire: Hear, all you boys of England, of Scotland, and of Wales./ Of the green isle of Ireland, 
the Mountains and the Vales/ The story of fierce Waterloo, ‘twixt two captains fought/ Who 
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never yet had met their match, in bloody fields though sought.80 According to the poem, the 
plans of Blücher and Wellington worked in perfect conjunction, Wellington acting as defense 
and Blücher as offense, allowing both to beat the French. The poem concluded by disparaging 
attempts to allocate victory to either captain; what was far more important was that Napoleon 
lost. 
 William Henry Fitchett’s juvenile history Deeds that won the Empire: Historic Battle 
Scenes also argued for a sanitized nationalism. In his preface he noted that his tales represented 
an “effort to renew in popular memory the great traditions of the Imperial race to which we 
belong.”81 Like Beeton’s, Fitchett’s publishers fixed the book’s price at a level affordable for 
children and it became a highly respectable seller, the six-penny edition selling over a 100,000 
copies.82Although his tome dealt mostly with naval battles, Deeds that won the Empire not 
surprisingly devoted a copious chapter to Waterloo. In this account, both British soldiers and 
their enemy came across as engaged in a chivalrous contest, whereas Britain’s Dutch and 
Prussian allies were less than able to meet the test of Napoleon’s genius. In a particular anecdote 
of extolling the nature of a hierarchal society, Fitchett relayed the story how a wealthy benefactor 
donated £500 for the bravest man at Waterloo. Wellington, the judge in this matter, rewarded 
Macdonnell, the commander of the Hougemount defense, who in turn donated this sum to his 
faithful sergeant.83 Fitchett also described acts of bravery and mercy on the battlefield, as 
Wellington’s troops sought to recognize the gallantry of their beaten foe. Although Wellington 
emerged as the day’s hero, Fitchett concluded that the Duke’s courage matched that of the 
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“rawest British militia lad.”84 Such a connection between British children’s innate bravery during 
time of war would be even more pronounced in the genre of Boy’s Own Adventure books.  
 One of the most prolific writers of these stories was G. A. Henty who wrote over a 
hundred historical novels for children between 1867 and 1906. His Waterloo novel, One of the 
28th, centered around the adventures of a young county squire Ralph Conway. Almost through 
with schooling at the start of the novel, Ralph visits a wealthy benefactor, Herbert Penfold, in 
1813. While at the Penfold estate, a French privateer collided with Ralph’s fishing vessel and 
Ralph becomes a prisoner of the French on their cruise to the West Indies. The privateer’s 
captain treats Ralph honorably and he eventually earns his freedom in exchange for helping the 
ship escape capture in its West Indies base. Making his way back to Britain, Ralph obtains a 
commission in the prestigious 28th regiment through Penfold’s influence. After dispatching a 
bloodthirsty Irish bandit, the regiment deployed to Waterloo. The text then alternates between 
Henty’s didactic recitation of the battle’s events and the experience of Ralph and his loyal Irish 
subaltern Denis. Although Ralph lost his arm, he learned that Penfold has died and left him an 
estate of £25,000. Ralph ends the novel quietly retired at his country estate with Denis as his 
butler. 
 Although of dubious literary merit, One of the 28th illustrated how deeply martial virtues 
attached themselves to British identity at this time. Ralph’s training, complete with hazing and 
practical jokes such as filling Ralph’s boots with water, was more analogous to a late-Victorian 
boarding school environment than the harsh reality of British Army discipline during the 
Napoleonic Era.85 Henty also asserted that Wellington’s British army consisted mostly of raw 
recruits, as exemplified by Ralph; yet their innate moral character ensured they could surmount 
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the challenge posed by Napoleon’s veterans. Of these British character traits, courage was 
essential. “The British soldier is always at his gayest when the prospect of fighting is before 
him,” Henty wrote of the troops marching towards Waterloo.86 Denis, the loyal, undereducated 
Irish servant to Ralph, acted as comic relief, whereas the Irish bandit, the Red Captain, 
represented a more sinister Ireland, a red-headed deserter from the Peninsular Wars.87   
 M. B. Manwell’s novel Geordie Stuart: A Novel of Waterloo incorporated Christian 
militarism within this more chivalrous conception of warfare. The main character, a young boy 
named Geordie, is a scion of the Stuart line of the Charles Edward Stuart whose childhood is 
filled with reveries of martial glory. Trusted in the care of his uncle Mr. Joseph and aunt Miss 
Betsy while his father serves his British sovereign abroad, Geordie practices his swordplay more 
than his Kirk catechism, wishing to fight in a cause “as glorious as that of the Charlies.”88 
Geordie eventually fails his catechism, but his guardians realize that his true destiny is that other 
Scottish alternative to a churchman, a soldier. On his adventures in the countryside, Geordie 
befriends a captured French soldier only one year older than him. This Frenchman, a Provençal 
named Denise, is of a noble mien, but frightfully homesick for his native land. Geordie enlists 
the aid of Miss Betsy, stirred on by her youthful memories of “Bonnie Prince Charlie” and her 
Christian charity to the homesick boy, in an ultimately successful escape attempt. Geordie, after 
his father confirmed his Mr. Joseph’s conclusion that Geordie will never be a scholar, later 
obtains a commission in the Scot’s Greys, just in time for him to depart for Belgium in 1815.  
 Manwell would present Waterloo as Geordie’s ultimate rite of passage, both to for the 
process of becoming a man and as a religious Scot. While nervously awaiting the Iron Duke’s 
order to prepare for battle, Geordie wistfully pines for his native land, but once Wellington gives 
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the word to prepare for the field, the “Scot lad’s heart gave a frantic leap as a Highland pibroch 
thrilled out its wail, shrill and high, above the din.”89 When battle came, Geordie would have to 
master his passions and await the order to charge. In a scene reminiscent of Scotland Forever!, 
Geordie and the Scot’s Greys charge, “like a mighty, raging, foaming human sea let loose at 
last,” once Wellington’s “eagle eye” had spotted a mistake of Napoleon.90 Amid the French 
ranks is Geordie’s friend Denise and the two soldiers immediately recognize one another on the 
battlefield. Before the two can speak, Denise parries a mortal blow aimed at Geordie by another 
French soldier. The young Scot continues his fight, but returns after the battle to find his old 
comrade in tears. Geordie at first assumes that Denise is ashamed of his nation’s loss, but then 
realized that his friend is dying. He embraces Denise, kisses his forehead and assures him that 
when they meet in Heaven, there will be no sides and “no more death, no more parting.”91 
Geordie returns home a hero, but Denise’s death causes him to shy away from extreme adulation 
and he embarks upon an illustrious military career in Burma, but always carries with the pious 
humility and notions of duty he learned in June 1815. 
 A noteworthy aspect of Geordie Stuart is the novel’s attitude to towards Scottish military 
history. Manwell used a portrait of the Scottish pretender Charles Edward Stuart as a 
metaphorical plot device which Geordie used as inspiration for a military career. At the end of 
the novel, Geordie hangs his medals under the approving eyes of his forbearer.92 The novel never 
acknowledges the contradiction of using Charles Edward Stuart, a Catholic who aspired to 
overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty, as source of inspiration for a Protestant warrior of the British 
Empire. Furthermore, Miss Betsy’s nostalgia for her “Bonnie Prince” becomes the harmless 
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reverie of a woman recapturing her youth. Manwell’s ability to redraft this period of Scottish 
history from a period of rebellion and treason to a quaint, martial loyalism reflected the long-
term impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Scotland’s public image in Britain. Milkes notes that 
Scottish-based regiments such as the Scot’s Greys would use the anniversaries of Waterloo to 
parade and bolster their image as Britain’s foremost warriors.93 Furthermore, Scottish military kit 
and dress such as kilts and bagpipes remained an anachronistic part of the Scottish regiments for 
the British Army through the twentieth century, thus drawing a tighter connection between 
Britain’s martial past and present with Scotland being its bridge.     
    Scotland’s success at recasting its checkered loyalist history was in marked contrast to 
that of Ireland. Although efforts such as the Maclise’s painting tried to associate Irish sacrifices 
in Waterloo, the sacrifices of Irish troops in 1815 could not transcend the vagaries of nineteenth-
century Irish politics. For example, the conservative monthly journal The Constitutional 
Magazine used the memory of Wellington against Gladstone’s 1886 attempt to introduce Home 
Rule for Ireland. In the September 1887 article “Wellington’s Words”, Wellington became the 
natural successor of Nelson to carry the fight against French tyranny on land. The article drew an 
analogy between the passions of the French Revolution and the popular drive for Irish 
independence. “A conspiracy of demagogues,” had stoked mob anger through “orations and 
seditious speeches at public meetings, and by violent publications through the press.”94 The 
article closed with an ominous warning towards the Gladstone ministry with a quote from 
Wellington that the greatest soldier of his age would never trust a traitor in government.95 
Although Irish Home Rule failed in the nineteenth century, its imminent success in 1915 
prompted the retired Irish colonel Charles Henry Gardiner to write a pamphlet Soldiers and Civil 
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war (Is the Centenary of Waterloo to be Civil War?) Invoking a positive view of the British 
military as the chief defense against tyranny from the time of the English Civil War onwards, 
Wellington and Waterloo have pride of place in their dispatch of French tyranny. Parliament’s 
passage of the Irish Home Rule Act ensured that civil war would again return the British Isles if 
George V and like-minded loyalists did not thwart it. To do so, the pamphlet concluded that 
patriots must “take the Great Duke as a guide-that he ‘would willingly sacrifice his life to stay a 
month of it’ i.e. Civil War.”96 Whereas Manwell’s novel illustrated how flexible historical 
memory could be, the realities of Irish politics precluded the use of Waterloo as a foundation for 
a loyalist identity. Henty’s Irish character Denis became Ralph’s butler, his loyalty being far 
more important than his intelligence. Emphasizing a specifically Irish contribution to 
Wellington’s army only accentuated issues of Irish separate identity; when invoked, as in 
Beeton’s poem or Maclise’s painting, their authors emphasized Irish comradeship with the troops 
the other kingdoms.         
 The net result of this memory cult of Waterloo during this third period was that it 
sharpened and exaggerated the British identity that had developed over the previous two periods. 
The Romantic theatricality of the earlier period fused with imagined reveries of the second. The 
historicism of Waterloo became divorced from its memorialization. With this trend it becomes 
possible for a Frenchman such as Denise to illustrate to a British boy the meaning of chivalry 
and Christian duty.  Authors such as Henty and Manwell or Butler’s paintings made a fetish out 
of historical authenticity, but in a world sanctified by a simplistic martial glory, their authenticity 
was no more accurate than that of the Astley’s seventy years prior. Henty and Fitchett’s open 
intent was to inculcate among Victorian youth a sense of war’s meaning as a transformative 
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experience through history. In a preface to his St. George for England, Henty baldly stated “if 
[our forefather’s] empire is ever lost, it will be by the cowardice of their descendents.”97 This 
simplification of complex and diverse historical processes ensured that this carefully constructed 
edifice of memory could not survive the tumult of a global war. 
 While this British memory from 1815 to 1914 evolved in three separate stages, each 
phase illustrates the relationship between identity and what Richard Price termed the “localist 
estate.” “The outstanding feature of the period stretching from William and Mary to the mid-
Victorian era,” Price asserts, “is precisely the expanding reach of local power and authority and 
the bristling vigor with which it addressed its obligations.”98 The central political question that 
preoccupied the elites in this political system was not that how to deal with the changing world, 
but the politics of inclusion and exclusion. The British political elite engaged in a series of 
adjustments, selectively choosing to incorporate segments of the population to better fit 
demographic realities. In earlier stages of memory, Wellington was the focal point, but by the 
time of novels such as One of the 28th, he is a distant presence on the battlefield. The memory of 
Waterloo reveals an ethnic and class-dimension to this localist process. As time went on certain 
groups could assume a more prestigious role in depictions of Waterloo. For example, the 
successful presentations of Scottish Waterloo valor such as in Butler’s paintings or Geordie 
Stuart reflected the growing acceptance of Scottish identity in British culture. The same could 
not be said of Ireland, as evidenced by the continued use of Wellington and Waterloo as political 
arguments against home rule long after the memory of both had become a largely cultural 
phenomenon. From 1860s onward, this localist memory gradually grew to incorporate the 
English and Scottish middle classes. Since Waterloo became a predominantly middle-class 
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memory, so too did fictional portrayals of the men of 1815 come to resemble the milieu of their 
audience. Consumption of alcohol, one of the central facets of the daily life of both officers and 
enlisted men of the British Army, is completely absent from fictional portrayals of the British 
soldiers. This was in line with the Victorian middle classes’ increasing preoccupation with 
temperance and the abolition of public drunkenness. The central task for this localist memory 
was to make Waterloo’s memory relevant to society. The net result was that Waterloo as a 
cultural icon developed into a participatory memory with significant, albeit concealed, barriers 
for its audience.   
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CHAPTER 2 
WATERLOO IN GERMAN MEMORY: 1815-1915 
 
 
No wreaths rest on German graves,  
Where Germans slumber, no green mound rises, 
Nevertheless their heroic names shine  
In proud marble 
As in their church, now Hall of Fame 
And the pantheon of quiet Waterloo- Martin Grief99 
 
 Martin Grief’s 1865 poem “Auf dem Schlachtfeld von Waterloo” condensed many of the 
reactions German authors and artists had towards Waterloo and its commemoration. Although 
the monuments of the battlefield acknowledged contributions individual of German states such 
as Hannover and Prussia, there was nothing equivalent to the Lion’s Mound, a massive earth 
embankment erected by the King William I of the Netherlands in 1820 to mark where his son 
allegedly died. Although many German names bedecked the plaques of Church of Saint Joseph, 
the British memorials overshadowed them. Nature seemed to be the only marker for German 
sacrifice in Grief’s elegiac poem: 
 There they fought, the good German brothers,   
 There they fell so early into the hero’s grave,  
 Over which the light blue lilac  
 Now flutters up and down.100 
 
For many Germans, including Grief, it seemed that Waterloo was a forgotten German battlefield. 
For German intellectuals like Grief, their task was to make Germans remember their past.  
 Germany’s convoluted political development made such a task incredibly difficult. James 
J. Sheehan succinctly put it, until 1871 “‘Germany’ did not exist…there was no clear and readily 
acceptable answer to the question of Germany’s political, social, and cultural identity.”101 
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German attempts to build sites of memory around the events of June 1815 reflected Sheehan’s 
assertions. Although German memory of Waterloo utilized many of the same motifs as British 
ones, Germany’s unique historical context produced subtle but important disparities. For 
example, although Walter Scott’s “The Field of Waterloo” shared a number of similarities to 
Grief, especially in the case of nature’s commemoration of the battle, it would have been 
unthinkable for a German nationalist such as Grief to extol Napoleon like Scott’s poem. Above 
all, German memory had to deal with the ambiguities of the Napoleonic Era and its complicated 
legacy for Central Europe.  
 The British experience of the Napoleonic Wars proceeded along the lines of a straight 
narrative in which a sequence of British military victories culminated with Wellington’s victory 
at Waterloo. German experience with Napoleon was a far more crooked narrative rooted in the 
realities of the Napoleonic Era. Every German north of the Austrian border experienced either 
direct or indirect Napoleonic rule between 1806 and 1813. The heads of the German states had to 
navigate very complicated political eddies to survive this expansion of French power. This 
produced mixed results as seen in the cases of Bavaria and Prussia. Bavaria, under the direction 
of its chief minister Maximillian von Montgelas, used its alliance with Napoleon to expand the 
Wittlesbach dynasty’s power and prestige. By contrast, Prussia’s disastrous 1806 decision to 
preemptively attack France led to the loss of half its territory and its forced subordination to 
French prerogatives. French influence was felt beyond that of state elites. Napoleonic 
administration irrevocably altered legal, economic, and social patterns in ancien régime 
Germany.  The failed invasion of Russia hastened the end of this political system as Napoleon’s 
German allies steadily abandoned him in the Spring and Autumn of 1813.   
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 When confronting this legacy, nineteenth-century Germans would adapt a number of 
strategies to homogenize the highly diverse Napoleonic experience. An important aspect of this 
phenomenon was to argue that the Befreiungskriege (Wars of Liberation) represented a natural 
terminus to the Napoleonic period, eschewing any accommodation with the French empire. Few 
writers would emulate the approach of the Saxon government, which in the course of 1815 
published two semi-official white papers, Der König von Sachsen Friederich August und sein 
Benehmen in der neusten Zeit (The King of Saxony and his behavior in the new era) and Wie 
wurden wir sind? (How did we become so?), which sought to explain to the Saxon public that 
the government’s alliance with Napoleon was both unwilling and the result of circumastances 
outside the king’s control.102 Instead of copying this approach, Germans writers and artists would 
represent the events of 1813-15 as a period of Germany’s triumphal victory over Napoleon. 
Figures in the resistance to Napoleon such as Blücher or Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm von Lützow 
became significant characters in this national drama. It is important to realize that while these 
multiple commemorations suggested a “German” experience, they did not necessarily have the 
same visions in mind. As Kevin Cramer persuasively argued in his study of collective memory of 
the Thirty Years’ War, many German historians and intellectuals would use their interpretations 
of history to vindicate their particular political and regional weltanschauung.103 The same 
process was apparent in German depictions of Waterloo. The national heroes of the battle could 
appear as exemplars of bürgerlich society in one depiction or as the sword and shield of their 
sovereign in the next. This process was far more contentious than in the case of Britain, where 
Waterloo helped codify the patriotic language of modern political division through popular 
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Toryism between 1820-40. In the immediate aftermath of 1815, there emerged what Clark 
observed as two conflicting narrative interpretations of the Befreiungskriege, dynastic and 
voluntarist, neither of which conformed to any clear-cut political division.104 In the case of the 
former, rulers of dynastic states tried to simultaneously retain their political and material gains 
while presenting an image that the Befreiungskriege vindicated their right to rule. The voluntarist 
strain of memory dragooned historical figures like Lützow or Blücher as symbols for a new, 
more participatory Germany. For example, the colors of Lützow’s Freikorps regiment of 
volunteers against Napoleon- black, gold, and red- became the basis for the postwar liberal 
cockades for a united Germany. Veterans of the Lützow’s corps such as Friedrich Ludwig Jahn 
tried to use the wartime experience to justify new modes of political thought. Jahn sought to 
create a healthy citizenry through organized gymnastics, but other reformers were more realistic 
and desired a national constitution. Amid such a contentious environment, German interpretation 
of Waterloo and the Befreiungskriege became mental battlefields upon which to project a 
triumphant vision of German destiny.  
 Prussia found itself the prime beneficiary of this divided memory in the immediate 
postwar years. Through a series of interconnected historical developments, Prussia shouldered 
the main German effort from 1813-15. Napoleon’s restrictions on the size of the Prussian Army 
forced reformers to adapt covert methods of recruitment more in line with a national rather than a 
dynastic state.105 Moreover, the upper echelons of the truncated Prussian Army retained a core 
nucleus of staunchly anti-Napoleon officers such as Blücher, August von Gneisenau, and Ludwig 
Yorck von Wartenburg. While the deeds of midlevel Prussians officers like Lützow or Schill 
were potent emblems of resistance, the actions of this anti-French circle could translate anti-
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French ideology into a tangible outcome. While in command of a corps guarding the remnants of 
the Grand Armee in Poland, Yorck independently reached an alliance with Russia thus opening 
up Central Europe to the Russian Army. Postwar political circumstances buttressed Prussian 
intellectuals and state elites’ attempts to exploit this gestalt of a Prussian-led liberation of 
Germany. The nineteenth-century Prussian military could exploit the military memory of 
Befreiungskriege not only due to its actions of 1813-15, but also because it was more ethnically 
homogenous than its main Austrian rival. Moreover, Austrian memory of the Napoleonic Wars 
was hitched to the political fortunes of Klemens von Metternich and his rigid conservatism. 
While Prussia would adhere to Metternich’s legitimacy principles, the Napoleonic memory of a 
dynamic Prussian leadership could justify an attempt to break from it. The eventual outcome of 
this situation was that Prussia was able to unify all the German states save Austria over the 
course of 1864-71. This development would have a crucial impact on the development the 
German memory of the Napoleonic Wars. 
 Like Britain, Germany’s memory of Waterloo from 1815-1914 evolved around three 
overlapping stages. The first stage lasted from 1815 to approximately the 1860s. Its central 
characteristics were that it consisted of local efforts to process and possess the memory of the 
Napoleonic Wars. This process included an effort to forget the period of collaboration by 
crafting a national narrative during which all Germans united to throw off the yoke of their 
Napoleonic oppressors. Where these visions of the past diverge is to what exactly the origins and 
goals of such a national effort were. The second phase began with the unification of Germany 
under the aegis of Prussia. This period witnessed Prussia’s gradual assimilation as the focal point 
for German history, especially in school textbooks for the new German empire. These efforts 
built upon the previous stage’s efforts, but excluded any alternative readings of Prussian history 
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that contradicted this march towards German unification. The highly provisional nature of the 
Kaiserreich’s political settlement and its overly determined approach to history created tensions 
within attempts to commemorate the Napoleonic Wars. In this final phase of German memory, 
the celebrations of the centennial of the Befreiungskriege offer a tantalizing glimpse into the 
tensions apparent in a highly-state centric national history.  
PHASE ONE: THUS HE TORE ENEMIES OFF OF US 
 In August 1819, the Hanseatic city of Rostock in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern erected in 
its market square a bronze statue to celebrate the deeds of its most famous son, Gebhard 
Leberecht von Blücher. The statue had a high artistic pedigree. It was the result of collaboration 
between the prominent Berlin-sculptor Johann Gottfried Schadow with the Romantic poet 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The statues itself incorporated a high degree of artistic 
anachronisms. It depicted the septuagenarian Blücher as a muscular man bent with 
determination; in his left hand he grasps a contemporary hussar’s sword and he wears the green 
smock of a Landwehr, his outstretched right arm holds a field marshal’s baton.106 The 
mythological Nemean Lion girded his upper torso, making it clear that Blücher was a 
contemporary Heracles. The statue’s granite base has four bronze tablets. The frontispiece used 
Blücher’s name and coat of arms, while its base carried a quote from Goethe: In peace and 
war,/In collapse and victory/ Alert and great,/Thus he tore enemies off of us.107 On each side 
were allegorical depictions of both Ligny and Waterloo. In the Ligny frieze, the new Heracles 
lay under his horse, referencing an incident in which Blücher had his horse shot out from under 
him. Fortunately a divine angel with a shield emblazed with the phrase “Germania’s Guardian-
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Spirit” protected the hero while his Prussian troops, in contemporary garb, beat a fighting retreat 
from their French enemy.108 The Waterloo frieze showed the mounted Blücher chasing away the 
French, represented by two nightmarish monsters, one a chimera-like serpent and the other a 
skulking horned-panther. In the heaven’s above, a winged goddess of victory holds a laurel-
wreath over Blücher’s head while two divine figures meet above an banner proclaiming the 
victory of “Belle-Alliance, 18 Juni 1815,” referencing Blücher’s preferred name for Waterloo.109 
    The mixture of antiquity and the contemporary signified the various ways in which 
Waterloo became encoded into for public display. The use of allegory in the friezes shows how 
by 1819 the incidents of Blücher’s life were already well-known in Germany that memory of 
them needed only a slight prompting. The anachronistic mix of the contemporary images and 
ancient mythology served to make an explicit comparison between the glories of the recent past 
and antiquity. The statue also had a strong participatory element in the case of Rostock. In his 
1821 biography of Blücher, Friedrich Christoph Förster noted “the city council assembled at 
Rostock and the citizens decided to erect a memorial, approved by the entire citizenry, and so 
now they appointed the Director of the Academy of Arts in Berlin, von Schadow along with 
Goethe in Weimar for its execution.”110 The city unveiled the statue on the anniversary of 
Blücher’s great 1813 victory at Katzbach. Yet this localist celebration also demonstrated the 
ambiguities the Napoleonic period held for contemporaries. Rather than portray Blücher in his 
Prussian hussars uniform and customary forage cap, Schadow portrayed the Field Marshal in 
quasi-mythological garb. But to portray him and Waterloo realistically would have celebrated 
                                                     
108
 Schiwago, Universitätsplatz Rostock, Blücherdenkmal Detail, Johann Gottfried Schadow 1819, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rostock_Bluecherdenkmal4.jpg  
109
 Ibid., http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rostock_Bluecherdenkmal2.jpg  
110Förster, Der Feldmarschall Fürst Blücher, 311.  
56 
 
Prussia far more than Rostock. Yet the image of Germania’s Guardian-Spirit protecting its hero, 
spelled out explicitly on the monument, hints that this monument had a national orientation.      
 The Befreiungshalle (Hall of Liberation) in the Bavarian town of Kelheim utilized 
identical methods of visual encoding and allegory, albeit on a much grander scale than Rostock’s 
statue. Designed and erected under the auspices of Bavaria’s king Ludwig I, this neoclassical 
temple dominated the local landscape at the confluence of the Danube and Altmühl Rivers. It 
commemorated the entirety of Germany’s deliverance from the French, with both the Battle of 
Leipzig and Waterloo being the central metaphors for the building’s visual symbolism.111 Built 
in the shape of an eighteen-sided polygon, the exterior of the building has eighteen 
representations of the Germanic tribes. Thirty-four goddesses of victory, each representing a 
state in the current German Confederation, encircle the interior’s lower level. Bronze shields, 
melted from captured cannons and embossed with the name of an important battle, link each 
statue. On the walls above the goddesses are eighteen escutcheons, each bearing the name, rank, 
and nationality of a German general from the Befreiungskriege.  At the center of the 
Befreiungshalle’s marble floor, illuminated by a shaft of light from the 150-foot high dome is the 
dedication “May the Germans (Teutschen) never forget what made necessary the struggle for 
freedom and by what means they triumphed.”  Like many neoclassical buildings, the 
Befreiungshalle has symmetrical balance. For example, the building’s pillars and columns are in 
multiples of eighteen. The choice of the number eighteen was not a happenstance; it was on both 
the 18 October and 18 June that Napoleon met his greatest military defeats at Leipzig and 
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Waterloo.  Although its construction was much delayed, Ludwig I would make it a point to 
dedicate the monument on the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig.   
  As a monument the Befreiungshalle represented an evolution of an earlier national 
monument erected by Ludwig I in 1842, the Germanic acropolis Walhalla, which in George L. 
Mosse’s estimation was “a temple [with] a Teutonic note predominated in the form of a Greek 
modal combined with German symbols.”112 Over a hundred marble busts of German figures 
dominated the interior of Walhalla, suggesting an evolution of a common German nation through 
its heroes. Unlike its predecessor, the Befreiungshalle used the Napoleonic Wars alone to 
symbolize sense of German unity. A battle like Waterloo, no matter how gigantic, represented 
just one of sixteen episodes of Germany’s triumph over Napoleon. Ludwig I laid down the first 
stone and at the monument’s dedication banquet he declared that the building symbolized, “our 
common German Fatherland, which takes second place to no other land, which has begun to feel 
that no foreigner could be allowed to repress it! Hail Germany!”113 The historical context of the 
Befreiungshalle underscores the ambiguities of Germany’s Napoleonic experience. Although 
meant for all Germans, the building is specifically rooted in Bavaria. Over the entrance, the 
words “To the Liberation Fighters, Ludwig I, King of Bavaria” drew a clear connection from 
exactly whom this monument to Germany’s unity originated. Moreover, although Ludwig I 
personally detested the French and Napoleon, as Bavaria’s Crown Prince he was an active 
collaborator up to 1813. As Crown Prince, he led Bavarian contingents of the Grand Armee 
against Austria in 1805 and 1809. The Befreiungshalle was also a symbol of a Bavarian state 
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whose power had grown in territory and prestige through its alliance with Napoleon.114 
Additionally, Bavaria’s post-1815 gains often had come at the expense of minor German nobles 
unable to match the power of the Wittelsbachs; thus expunging the remnants of the old Reich.   
But the Befreiungshalle did not commemorate those complexities, but rather sought to erase 
them. Its neoclassical symbolism presented a seamless transition between the German unity of 
1813-15 and that of post-Napoleon Germany with the Wittelsbach sovereign as a mediator. On a 
fundamental level the building itself was an image superimposed onto complex ambiguities. 
 Ludwig I bore the dubious distinction to be the only German ruler to lose his throne 
during the Revolutions of 1848. His massive art projects and illicit affair with the dancer Lola 
Montez alienated middle-class liberals and pious Catholic conservatives alike.115 Yet Ludwig’s 
ignominious end should not suggest that his notions of a Germany unified by the 
Befreiungskriege were only expressed by elite circles. Clark establishes that nineteenth-century 
towns in the Prussian Rhineland rang church bells, engaged in target shooting tournaments, and 
held local militia processions to commemorate both Leipzig and Waterloo.116 Nor were these 
competing German memories necessarily compatible with each other.  In an 1855 letter to 
Ludwig I, Klenze wrote that his architectural designs were not “the embodiment of a bourgeois 
necessity, but rather of a poetic-patriotic idea.”117 The colors of the Leipzig Freikorps became a 
potent symbol for political demonstrations against state authority such as the Wartburg Festival. 
This adaptation of a tricolor flag used the memory of patriotic Germans volunteers to obscure a 
mode of political symbolism commonly associated with the French Revolution. For middle-class 
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German liberals, this the legends of the nation in arms was a particularly potent argument for a 
more open government.  
 A popular method to convey this liberal patriotic mythology was through the historical 
novel. Among the most popular of these novelists in the mid-nineteenth century was Louise 
Mühlbach. She outlined her approach to historical fiction in her the preface of her novel Old 
Fritz and the New Era. The goal of the novelist was “to bring forth from the silent studio of the 
scholar and to expose in the public market of life, for the common good, the great men and great 
deeds embalmed in history, and of which only the studious have hitherto enjoyed the 
monopoly.”118 Mühlbach drew her characters from actual historical figures and used fiction to 
explain historical anecdotes. Born Klara Mundt and married to a prominent liberal intellectual, 
she was a highly prolific author and widely read; according to Mustafa only four authors were 
more popular than her for European lending libraries’ collections during the nineteenth 
century.119 The Napoleonic Wars proved a popular topic for her, with her 1858 novel Napoleon 
in Deutschland, translated into English as Napoleon and Blücher, covering the events of 1813-14 
from the perspective of patriotic Germans mobilizing to defeat Napoleon. 
 Mühlbach’s central protagonist is the eponymous Marschal Vorwärtz (Marshal 
Forwards) and the opening chapters of the novel focus in on Blücher’s forced retirement at 
Napoleon’s behest. Despite his deeply-held hatred for French rule, Blücher took comfort in the 
companionship of his wife Amelia. The couple enjoys a highly equitable relationship; Amelia 
attended to his needs and participated in the discussions of politics with both her husband and his 
guests. In addition to his marriage, Blücher also maintained a very progressive politics. For 
example, when Scharnhorst visited him, the novel’s Blücher congratulated his guest for his 
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liberal reforms of the Prussian Army and his resilience against aristocratic officers of the “old 
régime” who sought “to prevent Scharnhorst from becoming the armorer of German liberty.”120 
As Napoleon’s army retreated from Russia, Blücher emerged as the central voice of authority for 
those who consistently argued that that Prussian king Frederick William III should seize the 
moment and avenge both Germany and his deceased wife, Queen Louisa, the patriotic queen 
whom Napoleon had insulted. 
 After Blücher, the most heroic characters in the novel are two women, Eleonore 
Prochaska and Anna Lühring, who disguised themselves as men to join the Lützow Freikorps. 
These two historic patriotic women, eager to emulate their deceased queen, served as a literary 
device for Mühlbach to illustrate German patriotism evident at all levels of society. For example, 
when selling their dresses to a Jewish pawnbroker for their uniforms, the pawnbroker gives them 
more money than the dresses’ worth. He justified this in a speech extolling Jewish patriotism 
towards the Fatherland: 
 I have also a heart for my country, and no one shall say that we Israelites do not feel and 
 act like true Germans- that our hearts did not suffer under the disgrace which, for long 
 years, has weighed down all of Germany, and that we will not joyfully sacrifice our blood 
 and our life; and what is still more, our property, for the sake of the Fatherland.121 
 
The novel ended in 1814 with Blücher courageously leading his troops into Paris after having 
successfully convinced the King Frederick William III to pursue Napoleon. Although Mühlbach 
finished her novel before the events of 1815, there is little doubt as to how her flat and 
predictable characters would have behaved at Ligny and Waterloo.  
 Aside from her defects as a writer, Mühlbach was guilty of an equivalent degree of 
selective memory as was Ludwig I’s monuments. She dismissed the historical Blücher’s 
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eccentric behavior, likely brought about by his heavy drinking, as the natural outcome of a 
patriotic soldier unable to fight against a diabolical foe.122 The importance of companionable 
marriage and domesticity, hallmarks of her pre-1848 liberal ideology, emerged in the novel as 
the basis of Blücher’s ability to sustain himself in the dark period of French hegemony. 
Likewise, her depiction of a civil society united in a common nationalist cause also reflects many 
of the current aspirations of German liberalism at midcentury. This political movement aspired 
for a German Volk united under common law and patriotic duty towards the Fatherland 
irrespective of social class, albeit a society with Bürgertum-defined cultural and social mores. 
Given that both Mühlbach and her husband supported the 1848 Revolutions, her ambivalence 
towards the monarchy became even noteworthy. In the novel Frederick William III had to earn 
his right to rule and be worthy of his deceased queen and wife. When Yorck defected to the 
Russians against his orders, the king’s patriotic ministers persuaded him to support his generals. 
Additionally her portrayal of German patriotism excluded alternative forms of nationalism. 
Napoleon’s most loyal ally, the Saxon king Frederick Augustus I, asserted that he remained at 
Napoleon’s side not for the Saxon interests of Saxony, but rather because Napoleon 
uncharacteristically treated this German monarch with a paternal kindness. This policy of 
exclusion corresponds well with limitations of German liberal ideology, which advanced an all-
embracing vision of the nation, but could not incorporate movements at odds with a middle-class 
centered political order. 
 Ultimately, neither Mühlbach nor Ludwig’s political ideologies were dominant at the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Mühlbach may have been a bestselling author, but the 
contemporary state of German politics precluded the advancement of her brand of liberal 
nationalism inclusive of all components of society, including women and Jews. In the case of 
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Bavaria’s monuments, the fate of Ludwig I in 1848 suggested that there were limitations to 
whatever cultural power the Wittelsbach king possessed from his sponsorship of the 
Befreiungskriege. In part this echoed the problems Rostock had with portraying Blücher and his 
battles, there simply were no satisfactory metaphors to convey a universal message to the highly 
heterogeneous German lands. Ludwig’s physical and Mühlbach’s fictional appeals to German 
unity could not transcend the realities of German political division.   
PHASE TWO: ENDOWED WITH A LOFTY AND BOLD SPIRIT CAPABLE OF 
ENTERPRISES LOOKING LIKE TEMERITY 
 
 The creation of a unified German state in 1871 had a tremendous effect upon how 
Germans perceived their past. For example, Cramer observes that nationalist historians of the 
Gründerzeit (era of unification) such as Heinrich von Treitschke or Julius Otto Opel could now 
easily portray the 1871 declaration of an independent, Protestant-led Germany as the capstone of 
a historical development originating with Luther.123 Despite its structural faults, Bismarck’s 
Kaiserreich had concrete national and political boundaries; something quite unlike previous 
incarnations of German corporate identity such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Confederation of 
the Rhine, or the German Confederation. This unprecedented development made it easier for 
Germans to homogenize their history into a coherent narrative by using Prussia’s victory in 1871 
as a natural endpoint.   
  In this phase of German memorialization, Waterloo became a much more tangible 
memory with Blücher’s army being the natural predecessor of Moltke’s. Victory on the field in 
1815 became a retroactive confirmation of Prussia’s unique destiny. The contributions of 
individual German states such as Brunswick or Nassau became analogous to the current localist 
military arrangements of the Kaiserreich wherein Prussia assumed leadership, but each German 
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state retained its own army. While the Wars of Unification tended to displace the martial glory of 
the Befreiungskriege, it is important to note that during the Gründerzeit the Napoleonic Era was 
the last clear historical epoch that had occurred within living memory. The Kaiserreich’s 
economic development meant that a new, prosperous middle-class could now consume historical 
collectables such as busts of heroes like Queen Louise or mass-produced juvenile literature. This 
popular appetite for history combined with a formalized relationship between professional 
historians and the state created what Matthew Jefferies argues was an unusually strong 
Geschichtskultur (historical culture).124 Within this context, the memory of Waterloo was not just 
about understanding Germany’s past, but also its present.  
 As the movement towards German unification did not start with Bismarck, so to did the 
articulation of this variant of the Waterloo memory predate 1871. One of the earliest and most 
thorough examples of this was Christian Friedrich Scherenburg’s 1851 epic poem Waterloo: ein 
vaterlandisches Gedicht. Composed in blank verse, Scherenburg dedicated his poem to 
“Prussia’s Banners” and portrayed the Allied campaign against Napoleon as an idealized quasi-
medieval quest against the French: 
 Against this Colossus of Hate! All stand up  
 From their green round table,  
 Close hands and cross their hearts of the old covenant:  
 All for one, all against one!  
 And thus the eight states of Europe declare themselves against  
 The enemy of the world Bonaparte.125 
 
Although Scherenburg extolled both the British Army and its commander Wellington, the most 
active participants in the battle are the German warriors and their commander Blücher. Of this 
Prussian Army, Scherenburg wrote, “The Prussians were striplings, even younger in experience/ 
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But constant upon these three:/With God, for King and country!”126 In this poetic epic Blücher’s 
rash deployment at Ligny is the result of his chivalrous desire to form a dam against the French 
so Wellington’s scattered armies can assemble. Thus the poem rendered a military defeat into an 
action that was equal parts noble and militarily-sound.  
 Scherenburg also builds up Blücher throughout the text by repetition of “Forwards” 
(Vorwärtz) as a frequent motif, drawing upon Blücher’s nickname among his men. This had the 
effect of turning the Prussian Army into the active force of the campaign; while Wellington and 
the British were potent in resistance, they need the energetic drive of Prussians from young 
Germany to finish Napoleon. The epic ends with a hubristic Napoleon exiled to the ocean, but 
with the warning “Whenever the gods punish, weep and learn/ This is not a fable, it is only the 
past/ and what happened can happen again.”127 
 Like Scherenburg, the Prussian historian and active-duty officer Friedrich Wilhelm 
Varchmin also saw Waterloo as an idealized expression of Allied unity. In addition to his 
German-language version, he published his history in Dutch and English as well to celebrate the 
battle’s jubilee. Varchmin dedicated his English-version, The Battle of Waterloo: A Memorial of 
Jubilee for England and Germany, to the current Duke of Wellington in the hope that it would 
“have a fortifying, uniting, and encouraging effect on those nations who fifty years ago raised 
their banner in a time of troubles and calamity.”128 In Varchmin’s estimation, the three Allied 
states worked together to free Europe in 1815 from a renewed French slavery. In this account, 
Wellington and Blücher were ideal complements to each other; Wellington’s cool resolution is 
an ideal match for the Prussian, who was “endowed with a lofty and bold spirit capable of 
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enterprises looking like temerity.”129 When matched against these two men and their armies, the 
French were unable to prevail. Varchmin dismissed arguments about which nation bore chief 
responsibility for victory as a supercilious vanity practiced by neither Wellington nor Blücher.  
 Varchmin’s text articulated a vision that Waterloo contained relevant lessons for the 
future generations to an even greater extent than Scherenberg’s poem. For example, after noting 
that Germany could learn from Britain’s collective unity in 1815, he concluded that such unity 
would be useful for Germany in the context of the then-highly contentious issue of the 
occupation of the Danish duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. “What a fine lesson we can reap from 
the conflict of the little Danish insular people against the great German nation!” he wrote with 
chauvinistic aplomb.130 Varchmin expanded this argument by contending that Germany must be 
allowed to expand to her natural frontiers to protect against the French menace. The 1814 
decision for France to retain the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were particularly galling for 
him. A unified German state, Varchmin claimed, would be a beneficial center of gravity for 
Europe quite unlike the naturally rapacious France. In this variant of German memory, 
Varchmin’s constructs an argument that the nobility of Germany’s soldiers and commanders in 
1815 meant that unified German state could work to preserve European peace fifty years later.  
 Both Varchmin and Scherenburg laid the groundwork for the particular trajectory that the 
German memory of Waterloo took after unification. Whereas British memory at mid-century had 
begun the gradual process of decoupling the battle from current events on the continent, the 
German variant of this memory moved in the opposite direction.  The return of the Bonaparte 
dynasty in France only added more currency to this historical memory. Waterloo thus provided a 
convenient “lesson of history” for those Germans who did not wish to see a repeat of Napoleonic 
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hegemony. That Prussia was the main German actor in 1815 complimented its increasingly 
powerful position in Central Europe. Neither Austria nor the German Confederation could 
adequately guarantee the collective security needs of the smaller German states to meet the 
French threat. By keeping alive the memory of Napoleonic exploitation in German culture, 
writers ranging from Varchmin to Mühlbach endowed Napoleon III’s foreign policy with a far 
more sinister character than it possessed. Prussia consequently emerged as the leader of a unified 
Germany despite the presence of significant dynastic and confessional resistance to its 
leadership. The task in Berlin was to now make the new nation’s diverse population German.  
 One of the main tools for this process was the systemization of primary and secondary 
education. Although Berlin did not have any direct authority to impose national standards, 
Prussia asserted a steady form of “soft power” by virtue of being the largest market for history 
textbooks. It also used state power to sponsor ceremonies, such as Sedan Day which promoted a 
Prussian-centric view of history throughout the country. In the latter case, Karl Adolf Schmid’s 
1877 guide for teachers, Padagogisches Handbuch fur Schule und Haus, instructed its 
readers on how to arrange festivals for children on important anniversaries such as Leipzig or 
Waterloo: 
 For the teachers and community leaders, it is excellent to arrange such festivals, not only 
 because children are active, but at the same time they are reminded of the special 
 importance of anniversaries. [Community leaders] determine the occasion of each 
 festival; [teachers] will ensure that the all school functions remain the same. It requires a 
 communal, orderly exodus of the pupils, including instruction in gymnastics and under 
 banners and accompanied by music. A not too distantly-located forest meadow, or a 
 suitable free space in or on a forest are ideal; additionally hold sweepstakes with victory 
 prizes (the latter should be as simple as possible, without much material value, instead 
 their symbolic significance make them appear desirable- medals, rings, bands) and sing 
 all sorts of songs, especially Turnlieder [patriotic songs from 1813]. For this purpose the 
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 school has to ensure that the pupils always practice a number of simple patriotic songs 
 with lyrics and melody.131 
 
The above description of such a festival was one way to inculcate a dynamic patriotism in 
children. The children’s singing of the Turnlieder and participating in gymnastics allowed them 
to make a connection between their experience with the current state and the deeds of their 
historical ancestors. The ultimate goal of such ceremony was to create a communal patriotism 
rooted in this synthesis of school activities and pedagogy.    
 School textbooks would also try to build a corporate Waterloo by accentuating the youth 
of the German soldiers under the command of the heroic Blücher. This didactic use of the 
Napoleonic Wars “deliberately blurred concepts like ‘the people’ and ‘the Germans’ to embrace 
a broader pan-German identity.”132 The gymnasium school reader Deutsches Lesebuch für 
höhere Unterrichts-Anstalten  gave an highly idealized view of army of 1815 “ as breath of 
refreshing youth permeated the army; they were planted everywhere, but nowhere was the 
young, green grove as dense as in the Lützow [Freikorps]. Here a student was the neighbor of 
the young clergyman; doctors, artists, teachers, naturalists…all wore the colorless black.”133 
Behind such florid prose were gross oversimplifications of both army life and the social origins 
of the volunteers. Given that the text’s primary readership was young teenage men, the emphasis 
upon the army’s collective unity based upon such verdant youth was particularly noteworthy 
precisely because the history text extolled young men who whose social background was very 
much like its own readership. Furthermore, the emphasis upon Prussia’s leadership of the 
Befreiungskriege while acknowledging the heroism of non-Prussian subalterns such as the Duke 
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of Braunschweig-Lüneburg would serve as a retroactive justification of the current political 
order. 
 These textbooks also shared with earlier manifestations of memory by confirming a 
narrative in which Blücher’s energetic army rescued Wellington’s brave troops from a certain 
defeat. Ferdinand Schmidt’s textbook Preussens Geschichte in Wort und Bild visually encoded 
this idea with its chapter on Waterloo opening with a picture of Blücher’s arrival at Waterloo on 
a white horse cheered on by weary British troops.134 Unlike British historical depictions of the 
battle such as Fitchett’s, Napoleon’s despotism and victimization of the German lands 
overshadowed any nobility he derived from his military acumen. For example, one reading 
argued that Napoleon was able to build upon the innate “foolishness of the French” to build a 
Oriental-style world-empire which replaced the rule of law with an arbitrary personal rule 
enslaved to his ambition.135 This emphasis on despotism supported the argument that only 
Germans truly understood the nature of French imperialism in 1815. Although Britain fought 
valiantly on 18 June, Schmidt concluded that they did not feel the urgent need to pursue 
Napoleon’s defeated army. “Wellington’s national honor did not feel offended” Schmidt wrote, 
“England in the long struggle was not subjugated and humiliated, while Blücher and his 
followers held the full wrath of Jena and Lübeck in their hearts and had not forgotten the seven 
years of shaming the nation.”136 Blücher’s energetic pursuit, done after a herculean effort to 
march to Wellington’s aid, caused the French to abandon Napoleon and bring peace back to 
Europe.  
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 One of the problems with these patriotic histories was that their authors needed to explain 
exactly why a Prussian-led German state failed to emerge immediately after 1815. Schmidt’s 
textbook would argue that this failure stemmed from the machinations of Metternich and Tsar 
Alexander II of Russia. The Austrian minister above all feared that Prussia was now fulfilling the 
task begun by the Great Elector in eighteenth century through its assumption its natural 
leadership of Germany. The tsar’s mistress enticed him to attempt reinvigorate an archaic 
religious order inimical to the new patriotism evident in Germany. This alliance of religion and 
realpolitik at the Congress of Vienna made “a mockery of the sacrifices necessary for Prussia’s 
restoration of the independence of Germany.”137 The resulting German Confederation and its 
parliament could not satisfy the new German national consciousness evident among the returning 
soldiers. The consequence of this were decades of distrust between the Hohenzollern monarchy 
and its patriotic citizenry. Schimdt closed his textbook with the observation that the seeds sown 
during the Befreiungskriege “had borne their fruit in the present.”138 In this trajectory of German 
history, Waterloo was a prologue for the Wars of Unification in that it illustrated that Prussia’s 
national mission now had taken root among the true patriots of the Kaiserreich. 
PHASE THREE: TO YOUR PLACE YOU GRAY-BEARDED SIRE/ BUT YOUR WORD 
SHALL LIVE THOUGH YOU EXPIRE 
 
 During its forty-seven year existence, the Kaiserreich mined nearly every potential 
historical event that could substantiate its historical pedigree. The state would even appropriate 
and shape preexisting monuments for this purpose. For example, state authorities added busts of 
William I, Bismarck, and the elder Molkte to Wahlalla to after their deaths to make the temple 
better correspond to the unified German state. The Hermannsdenkmal, a monument to the 
ancient German victory over the Roman empire in Westphalia, had in one of its alcoves the 
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inscription that Germany united around the sword of Prussia winning her freedom at “Leipzig, 
18th October, 1813 – Paris, 31st March, 1814 – Waterloo, 18th June, 1815 – Paris, 3rd July, 
1815.” The use of the name Waterloo instead of Belle-Alliance irked some nationalists. Erich 
Marcks recorded that Bismarck intensely disliked the name Waterloo. Marcks described the 
chancellor’s ire over the moniker Waterloo during a state dinner:  
 Belle Alliance! That is really German. The British are ashamed of the joint solidarity of 
 the battle, never talk of our help, which really decided the battle; for them it is an ‘ill’ 
 Alliance. They say Waterloo. The undignified fawning of the Germans means they have 
 done the opposite. I am shocked every time I hear this battle’s name.139 
 
An anonymous 1875 editorial in the periodical Im Neuen Reich argued that using the British 
name for the battle betrayed both Blücher and Germany’s sacrifices over the past sixty years. 
The name “Waterloo” came about due to the machinations of Wellington who actively 
campaigned for this name to minimize Blücher’s contribution. The editorial claimed that relative 
obscurity of the Belle-Alliance nomenclature thus became part of Wellington’s, and by extension 
Britain’s, desire for glory at the expense of Germany. “We know,” the editorial states, “that 
Blücher and Germany’s wish remained unfulfilled at the time and that we have had to learn to 
expect nothing from foreigners.”140 The chauvinism apparent in this editorial illustrated one 
aspect of how the highly-constructed nationalist project had taken on a life of its own beyond 
exalting just the Hohenzollern-run state, particularly when it reflected a denial of German destiny 
by a vengeful Britain. Besides this stoking chauvinism, this militarized culture had become an 
object of satire. For example, the vacuous militarist protagonist of Heinrich Mann’s 1914 novel 
Der Untertan presented its readers a savage critique of the Kaiserreich’s jingoistic culture. As 
                                                     
139
 Erich Marcks, Manner und Zeiten; Aufsatze und Reden zur neueren Geschichte (Leipzig: Quelle & 
Meyer, 1911), 65. 
140
 Anonymous, “Eine falsche Aufschrift am Hermannsdenkmal” in Im Neuem Reich: Wochenschrift für 
das Leben des deutschen VolkesinStaat, Wissenschaft und Kunst- Juli bis Dezember 1875, ed. Konrad Reichard 
(Leipzig: S. Herzel, 1875), 534. 
71 
 
the centenary of the Befreiungkriege approached, each of these three responses to Germany’s 
historical past- state nationalism, mass nationalism, and critiques of both- would be evident in 
the centenary celebrations of the Battle of Leipzig. 
 1913 happened to coincide with the silver anniversary of Emperor Wilhelm II’s ascension 
to the throne. Wilhelm II intended the year to be a series of commemorations that would: 
 once again bring alive before us the events of the national uprising of Prussia 100 years 
 ago. May this remembrance of the past always help to remind us in the present what we 
 owe the Fatherland and incite us to apply the same loyalty, devotion, and unity in those 
 tasks Providence presents to our generation just like our forefathers 100 years ago.141 
 
Wilhelm II drew explicit connections between both himself and the actions of his Napoleonic-era 
ancestor Frederick William III, who bravely led the nation against his oppressors. At a 10 March 
speech at the imperial palace, Wilhelm II would use the memory of the Frederick Wilhelm III’s 
speech calling for a national levée en masse to suggest that the same spirit animated Germany’s 
contemporary army and supreme warlord.142 The centerpiece of the monarchy’s efforts in 1913 
was to be the October unveiling of the Völkerschlachtdenkmal in Leipzig. It was the largest 
monument at the time of its construction. Unlike neoclassical monuments like the 
Befreiungshalle “the language of its architecture was emotional rather than rational: designed to 
make the individual feel small and insignificant, yet at the same time empowered by a belonging 
to a national community of vast potential.”143 The granite-faced exterior of the monument 
resembled a large step-pyramid with only the barest adornment.144 Its surroundings featured a 
tended oak grove encircling a massive sunken reflecting pool. Visitors cannot walk directly into 
the monument; they have to traverse the sides of the pool and then climb a massive stairway to 
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reach the Völkerschlachtdenkmal’s interior, which is guarded by the patron saint of soldiers, the 
archangel Michael. The heart of the monument is a symbolic crypt. Eight masks, each flanked by 
a knight with a downcast head look to center, where a bronze tablet allegedly marks where the 
bloodiest fighting on 18 October took place. The Völkerschlachtdenkmal’s layout recreates a 
pilgrimage where one must traverse through various national symbols such as oak groves or 
Michael’s quasi-medieval armor to reach its sacred center.  
 The financing of the monument had a public participatory element, including lotteries 
and festivals, although Mosse noted that right-wing populist groups often took the lead in these 
efforts.145 The monarchy planned a massive festival to mark the opening of this monument to the 
nation’s sacrifices. Planned as the first great celebration for a seven-year cycle commemorating 
the anniversaries of both the Befreiungskriege and the Wars of Unification, the October festival 
sought to incorporate all of Germany in its public symbolism. 43,000 gymnasts ran a relay 
through the entirety of Germany, each carrying an oak sprig as a baton. The state planned their 
route with military precision so that thousands of relay runners would arrive at their destination 
in time to present the Kaiser greetings from the all the German “tribes” in the afternoon of 18 
October.146 Various political associations joined in the festivities, a Berliner Tageblatt 
correspondent reported there were “marksman, gymnasts, and veterans from various wars, and 
the guilds with their handicraft insignia, associations of post-riders and other state employees, 
and associations of everything that one can otherwise imagine as the purpose of an 
association.”147 The sheer overwhelming presence of this ceremony would create for both the 
nation and the world the impression of a nation united in arms under its sovereign, amounting to 
a repeat of the idealized vision of 1813. 
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 The state was not alone in the attempt to capitalize on the Befreiungskriege’s centenary. 
The opening years of the twentieth century saw the growth of a middle-class youth movement in 
Germany such as the Wandervögel (Wandering Birds) who worshiped both nature and eschewed 
the militaristic pretenses of their elders. In many respects this large movement was an outgrowth 
of the Kaiserreich’s pedagogy, which emphasized outdoor recreational activities and the 
symbolic power of nature. Although the state had co-opted some of these youth groups in its 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal celebration, over two thousand Wandervögel attended an alternative 
demonstration outside Cassel at Meiβner Mountain in October. This festival was not an explicit 
protest of the events in Leipzig, but in speeches given by its organizers warned against the 
militarism and contended that the heroes of 1813 were men united in common humanity.148 The 
importance of Lützow Freikorps was not their martial valor, but their youthful energy which a 
mass movement could remake Germany in the twentieth century. 
  The overly theatrical nature of 1913 centennial did not escape the attention of the 
regime’s growing corps of cultural critics. The arts magazine Jugend published a trenchant 
critique of the state’s increasingly bombastic anniversaries. Its editorial cartoon “Zum 
Regierungsjubiläum” featured Wilhelm II chauffeuring Germania in car symbolizing Germany. 
In a clear comment on these ceremonies, Germania leans over and tells her chauffer “Driver, 
After the 25 kilometer mark, drive much quieter with a smoother running.”149  However, one of 
the most prominent venues for disparagement of the state’s appropriation of the Befreiungskriege 
was the satirical journal Simplicissimus. This liberal magazine was one of the pioneers of modern 
German political satire using poems and political cartoons. It was also widely read, enjoying a 
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circulation of over 86,000 in 1908.150 The over-developed nationalist sentiment evident in 
October proved to be too obvious a target for the staff of Simplicissimus and it devoted its entire 
20 October issue to satirize the Kaiserreich’s interpretation of 1813. It would do so through a 
series of clever subversions of the state’s fifty-year long attempt to create a unified national 
history.  
 The cover of this issue featured a charcoal drawing of a stock image of the nation in arms 
by Wilhelm Schulz. In the cartoon, the population of a Napoleonic Era German town emptied 
out into the street. A butcher holds a banner, while at his side a young drummer boy beats the 
population to the colors. A youthful gymnast links arms with a soldier while both young and old 
participate in this mass movement. While this cartoon presented an almost quaint stereotype of a 
patriotic image, the poetic text beneath the cartoon turns the scene into a cruel joke: Good 
people, you must rise up,/ Not for freedom, not for your rights,/ But honest, loyal and dutiful/ For 
the princes and for their race!151 The juxtaposition of this text with the joyous scene of a people 
subverted the ideas behind the official celebrations of the state and presented a counter-memory 
of the Befreiungskriege, wherein the people’s forthright patriotism blinded them to betrayal. 
Hans Heinrich Chrier’s poem “1813” also expressed this transgressive vision of German 
memory. Chrier used the Grimm brothers’ legend of seven sleeping brothers who lie in an 
enchanted slumber on the coast as a metaphor for Germany before the advent of Napoleon. In 
this fantastical poem, Germany slumbers before being awoken by the French: And see, it was 
one Volk, a German Volk arising/ Where Princes and Prelates otherwise only found subjects.152 
Napoleon thus acted as a transient force, once dispatched he no longer mattered for a nation 
aware of the rule of law and citizenship. For this service, Germans in 1913 should extend their 
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arms over the Rhine River and call the French their brothers. As in the cover, the poem drew a 
sharp line of division between the common decency of the people and their predatory rulers.  
 Perhaps the most damning portrait in this issue was another Schulz cartoon, “Leipzig”. 
This cartoon depicted the carnage in the aftermath of October battle. In the background the 
whole city was on fire while in the left foreground contained a soldier’s corpse lay next to a 
spent cannonball. In the middle of this carnage both Frederick William III and the Austrian 
Emperor Francis II kneel in abject reverence. The faces of the two rulers wear stern expressions 
as if the two fully appreciate the import of this fateful battle. As with Schulz’s earlier cartoon, 
the accompanying text subverts this stock patriotic image. “O Lord God,” both men say “you 
have helped us against Napoleon. Now help us against our own people!”153 What is significant is 
that the satire in this issue was incredibly minimalist. All it would take to render Schulz’s 
cartoons indistinguishable from the mass of commemorative patriotic literature published in 
1913 would have been the substitution of its captions. Furthermore, the text required a token 
amount of historical background for contemporaries to perceive the target of the satire. In 
“Leipzig” for example, the text did not need to explain the long period of censorship and 
authoritarian rule practiced by the victors of 1815 to highlight the hypocrisy of the past and a 
present that venerated the former.  
  Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festspiel in deutschen Reimen, translated into English as 
Commemoration Masque, also relied on the Kaiserreich’s extreme historicism to make its satire 
work. The Silesian city of Breslau commissioned the Nobel laureate for their celebration of the 
centennial. Hauptmann’s play utilized proto-Brechtian theatrical elements to satirize the 
contemporary portrayals of the Befreiungskriege. In this single act play, the character of the 
Director tries to render a highly complex period of history comprehensible but his subjects keep 
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interrupting his attempts. The German heroes of 1813 are often a highly fickle and cacophonous 
lot in the play.  For example, after Jahn, Scharnhorst, Stein, Gneisenau, and Kleist each swear a 
“Schilleresque” oath to defeat Napoleon, the stage directions call for the character of John Bull 
to enter with a bag of gold and address the audience with characteristic crudeness: 
 You Proosians are a fine lot o’ ‘eroes, I say 
 You’ve got brave monarchs, and many a square ‘un 
 Augustus the Strong- now he was a rarew ‘un. 
 They all found out, long, long ago 
 That the Britisher’s pounds myke the German mare go.154    
 
Like Simplicissimus, the humor relied upon a carefully constructed juxtaposition of opposites, in 
this case the direct bluntness of John Bull that money makes war possible clashes with the 
loquacious patriotism of Jahn. Napoleon himself emerges as a sympathetic character in 
Commemoration Masque who cannot understand why individual Germans such as Schill are 
attacking his armies. In light of the centennial’s commemoration of these martyrs as heroes, 
Hauptmann’s dialogue is strikingly blunt: 
 My word, they don’t know what they do, 
 These poor, down-trodden German peons, 
 That sweat for princes and lords, and in aeons 
 Get a fowl once a decade to make a stew. 
 I free them from service ever lasting, 
 I make them disused to sweating and fasting,  
 End their hereditary feudality, 
 Bring them back to humanity from old bestiality, 
 And like these hussars, they return me but evil.155  
 
As Napoleon reaches the end of his reign, he becomes more cold and cruel with stage directions 
calling for him to be dressed as Zeus while his army collapses. The climactic battle scene 
reintroduces Jahn and his men, but the plot’s main focus is a group of anonymous men and 
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mothers trying to secure the lives of their loved ones amid the fury of war. The play ends with 
the character The First Mother transforming into the personification of Prussia’s victory, Athene 
Germania, making a plea for peace and love over war and hate. As the curtain closes, The 
Director returns to make his peace with the audience, only to be interrupted by Blücher, who 
neither realizes that the war is long over and that he is dead. The Director uses his director’s 
wand to command Blücher “To your place you gray-bearded sire/but your word shall live though 
you expire./ To you country I give it, as destiny’s foreword-/ Not your joy of battle; but- your 
Forward!”156 By appropriating Blücher’s message of forward movement but leaving behind his 
jingoism, Hauptmann indicated a need for Germany to abandon living in the glories of the past 
and embrace its future.  
 Not surprisingly, Hauptmann’s idiosyncratic play ran afoul of powerful conservative 
critics and ended its production run early. But the existence of it and the critiques of 
Simplicissimus indicate that the memory of the Befreiungskriege was far from homogenous on 
the eve of the First World War. Ironically, this occurred despite the unprecedented scale of 
monuments such as the Völkerschlachtdenkmal and public ceremonies surrounding them.  The 
fracturing of memory in this final phase represented the byproduct of this over-determined vision 
of the past. Previous attempts to create a universal German memory relied on a carefully 
constructed narrative that erased ambiguities, but Wilhelmine state nationalism tried to go a step 
further. It attempted to channel memory along lines that specifically glorified the state and its 
monarch. The 1913 ceremonies inaugurating the Völkerschlachtdenkmal tried to present a vision 
of a people acting as one to venerate the Kaiser. The state’s use of mass ceremony only helped 
foster alternative visions of the past as Kaiserreich could never quite reach its goal of a unified 
society. Cultural critics like Hauptmann merely had to observe the Kaiserreich’s ceremonies for 
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comedic fodder. Additionally, youth culture like the Wandervögel could now disseminate 
alternative images of Germany’s past and future. Yet these critics’ vision of the past was similar 
in many ways to that of earlier memory in that it exalted the people and used the lessons of 
history to demonstrate the power of a nation united. Although state nationalism failed to achieve 
its ambitious goals, it was also able to animate an increasingly vocal hyper-nationalism. 
However, as indicated in the Im Neuem Reich editorial, this nationalism’s support of the state 
could be highly conditional.  
 In the case of Germany, the attempt to keep the memory of Waterloo alive presented the 
exact opposite problems as Britain. In the British case memory developed along highly-informal 
patterns as the century progressed. Early attempts by George IV to appropriate Waterloo such as 
his commissioning of George Jones to paint two large battle paintings of Vittoria and Waterloo 
and then placing them between his own portrait fell flat for a British public that knew who really 
won these battles.157 The early appropriation of the Befreiungskriege by the smaller German 
states reflected the relatively weak status of German generals when compared to Wellington. 
Blücher may have been the epitome of that era’s fighting general, but unlike Wellington he 
eschewed politics post-1815 in order to spend his retirement drinking and gambling. Despite its 
greater size and wealth, nineteenth-century Britain never attempted to create a national memorial 
for the Napoleonic Wars on the scale of the Bavaria’s Befreiungshalle. As Prussia assumed 
control over Germany, it could incorporate these early exercises in state memory into its own 
state-building project as seen in the addition of Prussian Gründerzeit heroes into Wahlhalla. 
 Yet the Kaiserreich’s project to recruit historical memory for its own purposes did not 
proceed smoothly over the long-term. Alon Confino has pointed out that in Württemberg Sedan 
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Day was hugely unpopular outside of middle-class circles.158 Other incidents in the Kaiserreich 
suggested that unification had not transcended local loyalties. Military exercises between 
Prussian and other principalities’ armies sometimes devolved into brawls. Within this context 
then, the regime’s effort to capitalize on the centenary appears as much more than the quasi-
feudal dream of Wilhelm II. The Napoleonic Wars did have the benefit of a historical narrative 
of a united German lands against a common enemy. Yet the state could not play up that latter 
angle too much or lose control of Germany’s increasingly vocal right-wing. But by opting for 
such a carefully stage-managed memory, the Kaiserreich opened itself up to withering criticism. 
It remains unclear as to how where this stalemate in public memory was heading as the 
centennial of Waterloo approached because war intervened and historical memory became 
drafted into the war effort.     
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MOBILIZATION OF MEMORY: WATERLOO IN A TIME OF GLOBAL WAR 
  
 The 12 January 1915 issue of Simplicissimus published a cartoon that commented on the 
recent defeats Russia had suffered in the winter campaigns of 1914. Entitled “1812-1914” and 
illustrated by E. Thoeny, the cartoon juxtaposed current military situation with that of 
Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of Russia.159 In the background a long line of beaten Russian 
troops retreat in the harsh winter conditions of Eastern Front. Several wounded soldiers are 
visible and the army does not march in any coherent fashion. In the foreground lie two skeletal 
soldiers of Napoleon’s army, their uniforms strangely intact from when they died in 1812. One 
of them comments on the scene behind them. “I would never have imagined it,” he tells his 
companion, “that the Prussians would be the ones to avenge us.” Thus the memory of 
Napoleon’s defeat represented a hope that history had repeated itself. 
 Aside from demonstrating Simplicissimus’s trademark wit, “1812-1914” acknowledged 
the irony inherent in using memory of the Napoleonic Wars as a signpost for the First World 
War. The shifting pattern of alliances seemed to render moot any attempt to draw historical 
parallels to the current conflict. Russia, one of Napoleon’s most intractable foes, was now the 
ally of France. In a reversal of the situation in 1815, Britain and France were allies fighting in 
common cause against Germany in the Low Countries. For both Germans and Britons the 
approaching centenary of Waterloo posed a conundrum for intellectuals and artists as to how to 
celebrate the centennial without inadvertently eulogizing the present enemy. Many of the 
planned celebrations ended up cancelled. The London Times reported that the traditional 
Waterloo festivities such as regimental dinners were called off and the Royal United Services 
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Institution had abandoned its planned museum display.160 The battlefield itself was under 
German occupation and only narrowly avoided being the scene of more fighting during the 1914 
invasion of Belgium. The gravity of the war situation in both countries also created a highly 
serious atmosphere that precluded any public celebrations as on a scale seen during the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal’s dedication ceremony two years prior. Britain found itself adjusting for 
a massive war on the continent. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) sent to France in 1914 
had suffered severe losses and needed to replace its losses. Secretary of State for War Herbert 
Kitchener instituted a massive volunteer drive but some feared that Britain would have to resort 
to the unprecedented move of conscription. Germany was undergoing a similar level of 
mobilization. The war had submerged the political tensions seen during 1913 and public 
intellectuals tried to maintain a collective front known as the Burgfrieden (fortress peace). 
Having failed to achieve victory in the Western Front, the high command elected to build upon 
the victories in East Prussia achieved by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg the previous year. 
Behind this confidence there was a great deal of apprehension. The pressures of having to sustain 
a strong defense in the West coupled with the need to support of its weak Austro-Hungarian ally 
put the German war effort under a serious strain. In spite of this grim milieu, the memory of 
Waterloo still demonstrated a degree of potency in both countries as the centennial approached.   
 The persistence of the memory of Waterloo in the public discourse was due to a number 
of factors. Although a number of historians of the First World War have questioned the existence 
of a popular enthusiasm for war among ordinary citizens, it was clear that intellectuals were 
among the most animated by the war during these early stages.161 The needs of the wartime 
economy meant that the celebrations of the centennial had to be mental exercises, thus giving 
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public intellectuals a central stage in 1915. Furthermore, the popular histories of the nineteenth 
century fed the expectation that a properly conducted battle would be decisive. This created a 
demand that the historical Waterloo should reveal its secrets. A correct interpretation of 
Waterloo was essential in a situation where the stakes were so high. Lowenthal noted “the prime 
function of memory is not to preserve the past but to adapt it so as to enrich and manipulate the 
present.”162 What emerged in 1915 was a highly-charged memory along the lines laid out by 
Lowenthal. In this tense time both the German and British memories of Waterloo became 
inextricably linked to the wartime situation.  
 The wartime memory of Waterloo can be seen as developing into four interconnected 
strains. The first iteration of this memory was one of orientation. Already in 1915 there were 
clear signs that the war presented a situation unparalleled in recent history. Therefore, like their 
counterparts in the mid-nineteenth century, Germans and Britons alike would naturally turn to 
the last instance of a pan-European war for guidance. By drawing a firm connection between the 
past and present, the authors of this memory could provide their audience solace by claiming a 
national ownership over history. This utilitarian approach often involved the use of history as an 
advocate for their authors’ opinions on the direction of the war effort. Hero worship, the second 
variation in memory, also had a clear parentage from the nineteenth century. This form of 
popular memory sought to draft the heroes of 1815 into the war effort. The exaltation of generals 
such as Blücher and Wellington or the bravery of ordinary soldiers defending their nation had the 
effect of extolling the armies then serving in the field. Using history to draw a continuous line 
between the armies of 1815 and 1915 would metaphorically reincarnate the conquerors of 
Napoleon. The cartoon “1812-1914” should serve as an indication that this involved a great deal 
of creativity to create a coherent memory. In mining the past for contemporary heroes, the 
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commemorations of Waterloo also sought to use history to blacken the nation’s current enemy. 
This chauvinistic memory had a twofold purpose. First, it would seek to find evidence that the 
current enemy’s misdeeds had a clear antecedent in the past. The second purpose behind this 
chauvinism was to denude the enemy of any reflected glory from Waterloo. The final 
development of memory in this period involved the commemoration of the dead of 1815 through 
small, but symbolic acts. This discrete form of ancestor worship would seek to accentuate the 
importance of the link between past and present in a time of national emergency. 
FIRST ITERATION: WAR HISTORICISM 
 It has become a commonplace assertion in historiography to state that the magnitude of 
wartime mobilization in 1914 dwarfed that of previous wars. Much statistical information 
confirms this truism. David Silbey notes that between late 1914 and the establishment of 
conscription in January 1915, the monthly enlistment rate in Britain averaged 145,101 
volunteers.163 Although among historians there exists a considerable debate to the rationale 
behind this volunteerism, the numbers are high for a United Kingdom population estimated to be 
approximately 45 million in 1914.164  Germany conducted an economic war mobilization that 
reached far into the German hinterland. Roger Chickering relays a story that the Black Forest 
watchmakers’ cuckoo clocks contained essential parts for the manufacture of timed fuses.165 
Although accurate, this statistical picture obscures some of the realities of national wartime 
experience, especially for the first two years of the war. Even though modern communications 
made the battlefield a far less remote experience than in previous wars like the Crimean or 
Franco-Prussian Wars, the events on both fronts still had to be conveyed mostly via print media. 
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Furthermore, the static nature of the Western Front warfare and the expansive size of the Eastern 
Front meant that a majority of civilians often did not have a direct experience with the war. 
There also existed a considerable synergy between the wartime governments and public 
intellectuals during this opening stage of the war. Public intellectuals found that their ideas 
carried a deeper weight than during the prewar environment; they could now be the voice of the 
nation. For example, the Berlin historian Otto von Gierke wrote about the initial celebrations in 
an editorial in the newspaper Der Tag, “I seemed to lose my personality. A higher patriotic 
individuality had taken full possession of the consciousness of all [society’s] members. I had 
seen the ‘spirit of the people’.”166 Even though Gierke claimed to be part of this national unity, 
he became the mediator to his readers whom did not have direct experience with the celebrations. 
More importantly intellectuals like Gierke could use their position to place events into their 
conception of the grand scheme of world affairs. In the case of the latter process, historical 
memory was one of ideal venues for such an intellectual mobilization. 
 Using the historical memory of Waterloo as part of the war effort dovetailed with how 
the profession of history had evolved in the nineteenth century. Historicism, the intellectual 
school that believes the present is the culmination of past events governed by historical laws, 
dominated the mindset of both nations’ professional and popular historians. George Iggers 
astutely observed that nineteenth-century historicism saw itself as fulfilling a public need. This 
outlook meant that “history needed to be written by specialists, but not only or even primarily for 
them, but for a broad educated public. History was to be both a scientific discipline and a source 
of culture.”167 This elevated vision of history meant that in wartime the historical discipline 
become a means to advance a vision as to why war broke out while reassuring its audience about 
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its inevitable conclusion. For example, The Spectator’s 1915 review of A. F. Becke’s study 
Napoleon and Waterloo ended its positive assessment of this campaign history by noting that 
“from 1815 to 1915, history is repeating itself. It was again the miscalculation of British power 
and the magnificent tenacity and coolness of British troops that foiled the Prussian plan, as it had 
foiled Napoleon’s.”168 This war historicism could also manifest itself on local dimension as well. 
In the case of German schools, Andrew Donson has found that educators in 1915 would 
encourage students to write their own historical essays for local publication but only provided 
they write on topics such as “France’s Old Hate and the Desire for Revenge” and “The 
Apotheosis of Prussia in 1813 and the Mobilization in 1914.”169 As the centennial heightened 
public awareness of Waterloo these wartime historians would use their visions of memory to 
enlist Waterloo for the purposes of the war.  
 One of the earliest manifestations of this development in the context of Waterloo was 
Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s speech “Die geschichtlichen Ursachen des Krieges” 
delivered at the Charlottenburg city hall between 5 and 10 September 1914. This prominent 
Royal Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität professor of philology explained to his audience that 
history demonstrated that the Entente’s malfeasance demonstrated Germany’s innocence for the 
advent of war. The twentieth-century alliance of France, Russia, and Britain was the convergence 
of three separate historical trends. French culture proved inimical to any sense of national honor 
thus allowing the Republic to march with tsarist Russia and the same nation that burned Joan of 
Arc. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff argued that the rationale behind Russian alliance was a 
consistent, but misinformed, pan-Slavism. Russia after 1815 became convinced of its mission to 
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free its Slavic brothers in the Hapsburg empire, despite evidence that these Slavs were quite 
content to remain subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.170 The mortar holding together this 
coalition in 1914 was Britain. From the age of Louis XIV onwards, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 
argued, Britain had a consistent grand strategy which sought to prevent the emergence of any 
economic rival. From 1643 to 1815, Britain’s main enemy was France. Britain used its naval 
supremacy in this period to augment its economic strength which it then used to buy German 
proxies. It was during this period that the British character revealed itself. “[The British] 
purchased for themselves substitutes for entire regiments from our German petty-princes, but in 
their eyes our great king [Frederick the Great] was little more than a petty-prince, who fought 
against the French for subsidies and they would rely upon him as long as they got their money’s 
worth,” Wilamowitz-Moellendorff told his audience.171 In this formulation, history showed that 
Britain acted in only the vainest fashion; its martial glory tainted by a love of money.        
 This casual dismissal of Germany’s military worth even extended through Waterloo. 
Despite the heroic presence of Blücher, neither Wellington nor his nineteenth-century decedents 
would ever acknowledge Germany’s rightful place in the defeat of Napoleon. Blücher’s desire to 
call the battle Belle-Alliance was a sign of comradeship and partnership, which the British 
characteristically refused. By naming the battlefield Waterloo, the British erased Prussia from 
this moment in history.172 Britain was then able to use the prestige of banishing Europe’s 
oppressor to redraw Europe in ways beneficial to its trade, which included the creation of an 
independent Belgium to prevent Germans access to the sea. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff offered 
his audiences two alternatives for the future. Evoking both memories of Napoleon and the 
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Congress of Vienna, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff concluded that “far away lies before us the idea 
of a Napoleonic world-empire that degrades and enslaves unwilling nations, and it shall remain 
far from us. We will certainly wish in the future for a concert of different nations and among 
them will not be the pair, England and France.”173 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s view of history 
amounted to explaining how history had gone wrong since 1815, but more importantly how it 
now offered a guide to redress the errors of the past.  
 Wilhelm Hausenstein’s article “Das Zeitalter von Waterloo” appearing in the bimonthly 
left-liberal journal März used a historical model similar to Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s but dealt 
with Waterloo in a much more direct fashion. Hausenstein’s loose Marxist-interpretation of 
history argued that Waterloo did not so much represent a British triumph over tyranny, but as a 
victory for British capitalism over its potential French rival.  By using its trade and naval 
supremacy to enlist client states, “English diplomacy helped put together the first alliance against 
the revolutionary bourgeoisie.”174 Looking at the Napoleonic Wars as a whole, Hausenstein 
claimed that Britain’s avaricious mercantilism helped it not only to prevail in its struggle against 
Napoleon but to put its stamp on the postwar order. At the Congress of Vienna, Britain made an 
economic alliance with the clerical absolutism of the Austrian Empire. This resulted in Britain’s 
acquisition of a global network of trading colonies in Tobago, Saint Lucia, Ceylon, South Africa, 
Malta, and Helgoland.175 Against this relentless British drive to acquire and defend its economic 
hegemony, Napoleon needed to constantly maintain a string of military victories. Waterloo, like 
Sedan in 1870, proved one defeat too many for an imperial ideology that was unable to exploit 
its citizenry’s revolutionary energies. 
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 Hausenstein’s examination of this era projects an image of a Napoleonic regime that was 
highly ephemeral, whereas the British economic empire was a durable and far more sinister 
polity. For example, Hausenstein described Wellington’s career as an exemplar of service to the 
British Empire by stressing the global dimensions a military career that spanned from India to 
Europe. This has the effect of rendering Waterloo into a narrow imperial victory; one of many 
steps in Britain’s economic victory. In this formulation, current events demonstrated that the 
adaptation of name Waterloo over Belle-Alliance was particularly apt despite Blücher’s aid:  
 If one places this question [of who won 18 June] politically, as one must, there cannot 
 possibly be the slightest doubt about it, that the victory was an English victory; it is true 
 that the name “Waterloo” was political and not that of “Belle-Alliance” which was 
 so greatly championed by Bismarck. If the 18 June was a German political victory, then 
 1914 and 1915 would have been impossible: 1914 and 1915 is the name of the war of 
 England and its vassalage against Germany.176  
 
In this view, Germany, and Europe by extension, lost the Napoleonic Wars to a global economic 
empire. This prevented Europe from developing along natural lines. In one case outlined by 
Hausenstein, Prussian Prime Minister Stein was unable to secure German borders when 
Wellington used his Waterloo-derived prestige to block Prussian acquisition of Alsace and 
Lorraine.177 By drawing up such a stark historical portrait of British mercantilism, “Das Zeitalter 
von Waterloo,” presented its audience a hope that Germany would emerge victorious now that its 
people knew the historical basis for the entire continent’s true enemy: Britain.  
 In Britain, many writers would suggest that history vindicated Britain’s current system of 
alliances. In its special coverage of the centennial, The Times avowed that: 
 Waterloo made possible the development of a new France, enlightened and disciplined by 
 all the rich experiences of the revolutionary epoch, of a France which, since the lines of 
 her progress were henceforth set on the principles of ordered liberty, was brought 
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 inevitably into closer sympathy with Great Britain, whence the inspiration of these 
 principles had originally been derived.178 
 
In this formulation, the sacrifices of the British at Waterloo made France safe for democracy. 
Furthermore, the military heroism of 1815 could translate into extolling its Entente descendents. 
Herbert Maxwell’s article “Waterloo” in June 1915 Cornhill Magazine illustrated this approach. 
This Scottish intellectual and retired Tory MP stated intent was explain to his readers the “certain 
points which have become controversial, or of which the importance has been underrated or 
misunderstood,” but his narrative had the effect of extolling Britain’s current Belgian ally. For 
example, he relayed the incident in which a Belgian contingent, acting without orders at Quatre-
Bras, managed to secure Wellington’s flank. Maxwell then posed the rhetorical question “is there 
not some parallel between this dislocation of Napoleon’s offensive and that of the German 
Emperor’s offensive in August 1914?”179 Maxwell’s attempt to restore Belgians’ reputation was 
at odds with British historiography on the Waterloo campaign, which typically asserted that the 
Belgian troops were unreliable and desired a restoration of French rule. Maxwell acknowledged 
this preconception but explained that among the Belgian units, the most cowardly regiments 
were Nassau Germans amalgamated into the Belgian forces.180 By challenging the historiography 
in this fashion, Maxwell illustrated how Belgium’s current stand against Germany was an event 
with a clear historical precedent.     
 The above articles may have explained something of the current war’s long-term origins 
to their readers, but they do not offer them any guidance for how to defeat their enemy. Not all 
examples of war historicism were as vague about what to do with history. In two instances the 
centennial memory of Waterloo would be used by British writers to resolve the vexing issue of 
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national conscription, which Silbey noted was one of the most contentious domestic political 
issues in 1915.181 The Nation’s 12 June 1915 editorial “Waterloo Tits” argued for the 
continuation of Kitchener’s volunteer army on the basis of its analysis of Wellington’s 1815 
army. “Waterloo Tits” was the northern England name for an 1815 veteran. The editorial 
outlined the main features of the daily life of one of these volunteer rankers. They had to carry an 
identical load as a contemporary British soldier, drank heavily, and could be capable of the worst 
excesses such as the sack of Badajoz.182 Despite their imperfections, these were the men that beat 
Napoleon’s mass-conscript army at Waterloo. The editorial’s conclusion described the parallels 
between the “Waterloo Tits” and the current BEF. After drawing upon the testimony of 
Napoleonic Era generals such as John Moore the author asserted “we may compose a fairly 
accurate portrait of our present ‘Tommy’s’ natural ancestor-more drunken, more brutal, capable 
of appalling crimes…but possessing in himself the roots of all that is best and most characteristic 
of our present battalions- the unshaken endurance under danger and suffering, the kindly humor, 
and ironic stoicism.”183 In this reading of history, the adaptation of conscription would import a 
foreign element that would alter the natural character of the British Army and thus prevent 
another Waterloo victory. 
 The popular military historian Cecil Battine offered an alternative interpretation of 
Waterloo that lent support to the establishment of conscription. Battine’s “How to Celebrate the 
Centenary of Waterloo” argued that Napoleon’s blunders and the British superiority in 
combined-arms merged to ensure Britain’s victory. Although Battine acknowledged the Prussian 
contribution to the battle, he dismissed this “starveling kingdom’s” effort as meaningless when 
                                                     
181
 Silbey, The British Working Class, 34-7. 
182
 Anonymous, “Waterloo Tits,” The Nation June 12, 1915, 347.  
183
 Ibid., 348.  
91 
 
contrasted to the superb defensive capabilities of British troops.184 Both the British government 
and society allowed this mixture of success to atrophy during the nineteenth century. Yet this 
particular lesson of history was not lost on the Prussians who maintained and expanded their 
army. The result was that only by a “miracle of good luck” that the BEF was able to fight off this 
modern army. Because of this reprieve, the “best way of celebrating the centenary of the Battle 
of Waterloo will be the enactment of conscription in the United Kingdom, thus restoring it to the 
position which it held among European states one hundred years ago, and which had been lost in 
the interval by suicidal apathy and indifference to our national interests.”185 Behind Battine’s 
hectoring was the notion that history carried with it an objective lesson made more urgent by 
wartime events. 
 German intellectuals could also use Waterloo to advocate or justify specific war policies, 
as evidenced by two anonymous articles appearing in the Social Democratic Party-affiliated 
journal Die Zukunft. The 1914 article “Wir sind Barbarei” claimed that Germany’s current 
conquests of Liège, Brussels, and Namur “are the announcement of a new Waterloo. One in 
which Germany smashes its enemies to pieces.”186 The article went on to illustrate how the 
previous incarnation of Waterloo also displayed Germany’s native martial valor. Blücher 
managed to save Wellington despite his personal injuries the Prussian had suffered Ligny. 
Wellington repaid this generous act by refusing to accede to the name Belle-Alliance and instead 
naming the battle after his own headquarters, where no fighting had taken place. The article cited 
the battle report of Gneisenau, which confirmed Wellington’s duplicity “to which every Briton’s 
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cheeks, especially those of Kitchener’s, must redden with shame.”187 The new German Army in 
Flanders has the same heroism as its predecessor a century before, but it also possessed the 
benefits of the Burgfrieden where millionaires and day-laborers united in common cause. The 
result was that the German Army should adapt a Carthaginian campaign and replay the role 
played by their Teutonic ancestors who destroyed the tyranny of Rome.188 The 1915 Zukunft 
article “Wer hat es besser?” used the events of 1815 to justify German occupation of Belgium. 
After bravely vanquishing the French, both German statesmen and soldiers wished to remove the 
fortress system established by Louis XIV that was a perpetual “thorn in the side of the German 
borders, but also to plant the Germanic pinion in the land of the Flemings and Walloons. If this 
wish would have taken root, then the England of Wellington would have striven to hinder it with 
as much zeal as the one of Kitchener’s.”189 The article repeated what was quickly becoming the 
stock narrative of Germany’s Waterloo experience: chivalrous German heroes like Blücher 
saving Wellington at the right moment on 18 June, only to have Britain betray her ally for a 
narrow-minded desire to dominate the continent economically. The author of “Wer hat es 
besser?” concluded that given this trade-centered mindset of Albion, Germany’s decision to a 
submarine fleet was well-founded.190  
 Despite both nations’ use of war historicism to explain the wartime situation, there was a 
fundamental difference between German and British approaches to 1815. The German variant of 
memory was preoccupied with how Germany never reaped the proper benefit for her 
contributions to victory in 1815. This memory presented a vision in which history turned in the 
wrong direction because Britain’s greed prevented the expansion of German trade and 
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prosperity. British memory, however, focused much more on the battle itself. These writers thus 
tried to present Waterloo as an ideal battle wherein both British and their Belgian allies 
eventually found kindred spirits among the French, paralleling the current conflict. When the 
Germans emerge in British accounts, it was either as interlopers trying to steal Wellington’s 
glory or dilettantes committing grave military errors. Neither side wished to abandon the glory of 
Waterloo, but both had to explain how such a great victory created the preconditions of an 
inevitable war. 
SECOND ITERATION: HERO WORSHIP 
  As both Germany and Britain gradually progressed towards a wartime state in 1915, their 
respective military commanders assumed a greater degree of political power. In a particularly 
telling case, Wilhelm II found himself shunted away from military decisions, even though the 
Kaiserreich’s constitution granted him the emperor the title Supreme War Lord. Although 
Britain had a long- established system of civilian control over the military, Kitchener’s 
appointment as Secretary of War was the first time an active-duty soldier had received a cabinet 
position. On the battlefield, commanders such as John French or Helmuth von Moltke the 
Younger became widely known figures. Few wartime generals, however, achieved as much fame 
as Hindenburg, the venerable Prussian commander approaching his seventies who cemented his 
celebrity from a series of battles on the Eastern Front in 1914. These generals became something 
of early media stars. This growing presence of the military in the public discourse meant that 
both German and British society looked to soldiers of the past to contextualize the present.  
 This enlistment of the heroes of the past was particularly easy in the case of Waterloo 
because both publics had been socialized with the protagonists of the 1815 over the course of a 
century. Eulogizing the soldiers of Waterloo also helped justify the war effort. Richard Frankel 
94 
 
observes that German celebrations of Bismarck during the First World War helped demonstrate 
the value of using a military solution to a resolve a crisis.191 In the case of the memory of 
Waterloo, Frankel’s premise is even more persuasive. As seen in the previous two chapters, both 
nations had long cultivated the memory of Waterloo as an ideal decisive battle. Beyond their 
military acumen, novels such as Napoleon and Blücher and Fitchett’s popular history extolled 
the officers and men of the Napoleonic Era as paragons of personal virtue. This iteration of 
memory built directly upon the imagery and motifs that developed during the nineteenth century 
to create a sense that the Waterloo’s heroes were a distant reflection of the current combatants. 
 The early comparison between Blücher and Hindenburg was a relatively easy analogy 
during the initial war years. Both men possessed a number of parallels. They were both of 
advanced age and their generalship tended towards offensive actions. Hindenburg and Blücher 
also both relied upon a young, energetic chief of staff to translate their offensive spirit into 
action. One of the earliest panegyrics of Hindenburg, Bei Hindenburg: von seinem Leben und 
seinem Wirken relayed to its German audience how Hindenburg’s men saw him as a reincarnated 
Blücher. After making a tactical retreat from Warsaw, the biographer reports his troops’ opinion 
of his methods: “If Hindenburg ordered us to retreat, we were confident that he was ordering us 
to a new way to a new victory. We named him anew ‘Marshal Forwards the Second’, because we 
knew that he is advancing even when retreating.”192 In this account, the memory of Blücher 
developed during the nineteenth century helped to sustain confidence in his spiritual successor’s 
Fabian strategy during early 1915.  
 The BEF commander John French won no equivalent battle on the scale of Hindenburg’s 
1914 victory at Tannenburg. Yet that would not stop some British writers to draw a connection 
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between French and his more successful 1815 forbearer. George Herbert Perris’s military history 
The Campaigns of 1914 in France and Belgium adapted a highly novelistic view of the BEF 
commander and where he fit in the context of Waterloo. As French first entered into Belgium, 
Perris informed his readers that Waterloo was firmly on the BEF commander’s mind: 
 When John French faced north from Mons, a few miles from the field of Waterloo where, 
 a century before, Wellington faced south against the greatest of adventurers, he showed 
 England once more stepping aside from her own paths to help the small peoples of this 
 middle tract of the Old World, and casting her weight against the challenge of an upstart 
 imperialism.193 
 
Through his use of direct analogies, Wellington faced south and French north, Perris creates a 
symmetrical convergence between these two historical figures that is easy for his readers to 
understand. Perris then uses this metaphor to further embellish Britain’s current nobility, already 
established in 1815. A notable aspect of these portraits of Hindenburg and French was that these 
reports from the front were very recent events, but their authors ensured that Waterloo’s memory 
imbued these events with a meaning that fit neatly into the broader stream of history.  
 A common subgenre in both nations was to have Waterloo commanders return to earth in 
spectral form to aid their descendents. For example, in 1914 the Canadian-born editorial 
cartoonist Boardman Robinson published a sketch featuring the ghosts of Napoleon and 
Wellington pointing to a storm on the horizon over the caption “This time we come side by 
side.”194 Gustav Hochstetter’s comedic poem “Kaffee Walhalla: Phantastische Szene aus ernster 
Zeit” opened up in a strangely empty Valhalla. The two valkyries marvel at why the halls are so 
empty. As the poem progressed the whole pantheon of German heroes appeared to inform each 
other of the current condition of their homeland. Blücher informs his Napoleonic Era colleagues 
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Scharnhorst, Yorck, and Gneisenau of the situation, “A real spectacle for heroes and heaven!” he 
says.195 He then describes the changed state of affairs to his friends:  
 Blücher: If my old mind understands it right,  
  Then it seems that things go differently.  
  The Frenchman and Rus’ have a third ally.  
 Yorck: What? 
 Blücher: Naturally, the beloved British!  
 Yorck (doubtfully): Your old friend from Waterloo?  
 Blücher: Yes, England stands now on another side.  
 Gneisenau: I shall not know this Wellington,  
  What do you call him?  
 Blücher: The modern Briton is a different person  
  His Wellington of today - Mr. French.196  
 
Slowly more deceased German heroes return from earth, informing their comrades that the 
Germans have renewed their spirit of old and are beating back their enemies. Richard Wagner 
informs them that the valkyries will have more work to do welcoming new heroes into Valhalla 
and Bismarck, up to this point silent, closes the dialogue by sternly expressing his pride in the 
German soldiers.197  
 The song “A Slight Misunderstanding at the Jasper Gate” by Henry Lawson portrayed 
Saint Peter as mystified by the pantheon of British military heroes breaking out of Heaven to 
assist their nation. Not surprisingly, the last hero to depart to assist the BEF troops in Flanders: 
 It is Wellington, where French is, who has 
  broken Heaven's trenches,  
 With his purple-blooded captains (who 
  used purple language then)  
 Come to strengthen with his spirit all the  
  coolness you inherit—  
 He who took the scum of Europe, and who 
  trained them to be Men.198 
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Although both Lawson and Hochsetter’s afterlife contain elements a frenetic humor, their use of 
the afterlife reflected a serious intent. In this time of stress and uncertainty, this use of the 
supernatural theme had the effect of revivifying the dead. Paul Fussell’s literary analysis of the 
First World War observes one of the reactions to industrial warfare was a reinvigorated 
mythology and a heightened sensibility of the public to superstition.199 Resurrecting these heroes 
fit within Fussell’s analysis because the supernatural was one way to try and make these figures 
relevant for the modern world. These men could then exist simultaneously in both the present 
and the past. Furthermore, rendering these heroes into spirits gave their authors more leeway in 
their depictions than a conventional history text. Alfred Gordon’s poem “Judgment of Earth, or 
Waterloo 1914” even managed to enlist Blücher to aid the British war effort. Addressed to 
Wilhelm II during the initial invasion of Belgium: 
 What auguries and portents dost thou see,  
 As now thine hosts to Waterloo draw near?  
 What spirits in the deepening night appear,  
 Awaked from slumber through a century?  
 Doth Blücher's shade rise up and say to thee  
 That French by Germans first were routed here,  
 And those dire happenings of that fateful year  
 Yet once again in this our day shall be?200 
 
Gordon’s use of Blücher’s shade was one of the more creative ways this variant of hero-worship 
could manifest itself, allowing the author to mobilize a historical figure of the enemy against his 
country. 
 Not surprisingly, Fitchett weighed in on the importance of Wellington to the current 
conflict. His centennial article “A Great Soldier and His Battles” celebrated both Wellington the 
soldier and the statesmen. “Wellington, in a word, restored British self-respect in that one field 
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where it had suffered many wounds,” Fitchett wrote.201 Wellington emerges in Fitchett’s account 
as a supreme warlord and politician whose acumen only exceeded his modesty. In particular, 
Wellington’s battle dispatches were concise so as to avoid accepting undue credit for victory. He 
had no desire to use history for his own benefit, unlike Napoleon.202 In the case of Waterloo, this 
humility only confused the accounts of the battle as other soldiers, Germans in particular, tried to 
appropriate Wellington’s victory. This created a needless historical debate that obscured the 
simple fact that Wellington carried the day. This emphasis upon Wellington’s character had the 
effect of rendering any debate about his military glory meaningless. According to Fitchett, 
“Waterloo proved that Wellington had - mixed in with other very inadequate material- enough of 
that very useful ‘article’, the British private.”203 Fitchett’s snide discounting of German 
contribution, the “inadequate material”, coupled with his assertion that the historical 
complexities were the result of selfish vanity ensured that Waterloo remained a national victory 
of which Britons could be proud for it created a century of peace. Implicit in this form of hero 
worship is the view that if Britons all repeated this performance, another hundred years of peace 
may result.       
 Hero worship was not limited to the commanders of 18 June. Paul Kämpfe’s popular 
history Ligny und Waterloo celebrated the role of the entire Prussian Army in the defeat of 
Napoleon. In his account, Blücher is the beloved father figure of his men, able to drive them on 
to great victories. He is also a true German patriot that eschewed participation in the Congress of 
Vienna because the politicians were busy carving up Germany, to Wellington’s confusion.  
Kampfe further lauds the Prussian Army by a series of contrasts to the British Army of 1815: 
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 The British officers for the most part belonged to the high nobility and the English 
 soldiers were no people’s army from all classes like the Prussian Army, but rather bought 
 soldiers lured the most money and the best price. They willingly underwent corporal 
 punishment. The English Army lacked the national feeling which held together all 
 soldiers from the field marshal to the last camp-follower in a strong love for the 
 Fatherland and Volksgemeinschaft, which made the Prussian so strong and unified.204     
 
The only units in Wellington’s army to feel the same level of national feeling were the 
Hannoverian and Braunschweiger troops. Those units emerge as the foremost examples of 
bravery in Kampfe’s account of Quatre-Bras. The Braunschweig soldiers fight hard to protect 
their position. When their commander, the Duke of Brunswick, is wounded, three of the 
Braunschweigers, Corporal Külbel, Jäger Reckau, and Bugler Aue, try to desperately reach their 
Duke. Although they fail to save him, they carry his corpse away from the battlefield and thus 
prove themselves worthy subordinates of the legendary Black Duke.205 Although the Duke 
Frederick William became famous for his bravery, in Kämpfe’s account his ordinary soldiers are 
equally deserving of this honor. 
 When acclaiming the heroism of their Waterloo soldier, writers in both nations possessed 
a vast corpus of nineteenth-century historical research upon which to support their conceptions 
of heroism. Furthermore, the prevalence of the Napoleonic Wars in both nineteenth-century 
educational system and popular culture meant that First World War-era audiences had some 
familiarity with the subject. Therefore Robinson could depict Napoleon and Wellington’s ghosts 
and be certain that a sizable percentage of his readership understood his metaphor. This was an 
essential ingredient for this mobilization of memory for the war effort. An established military 
pedigree from 1815 proved highly useful as military leaders became more prominent in wartime 
society, as seen in the case of Hindenburg as the reincarnation of Blücher. An explanation of the 
heroism of the past like Kämpfe’s Ligny und Waterloo also exalted the rank and file of the 
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current army. Their current descendants behaved much as their forbearers did when facing 
Napoleon. 
THIRD ITERATION: CHAUVENISM 
 The war witnessed a general coarsening of the public discourse, as evidenced by many of 
the authors listed above. In this intense environment intellectuals were willing to entertain the 
worst stereotypes about their enemy. For example, before the author of “Wir sind Barberen” 
called for a rhetorical reenactment of the fall of Rome, he stated “England is allied with ‘yellow 
stink-apes’ [the Japanese] and revels in the news that that German men are mangled, and German 
women were shamed by drunken Cossacks.”206 Nor was this tendency limited to Germany. One 
of the most intractable rumors that enjoyed wide currency among Britons was that the Germans 
wantonly crucified a Canadian soldier in full view of his unit.207 Both countries saw the other as 
the basis of the conflict and thus a feeling of indignation fed this chauvinism. While this British 
conception of German guilt was due to the latter’s position as the titular leader of the Central 
Powers, German Anglophobia’s roots lie in the conjunction of prewar geopolitical and cultural 
factors that could be arranged to fit into a narrative of British perfidy. This trend cemented itself 
in the wartime milieu despite the significant contacts between the two countries before the war. 
As the war escalated both Britain and Germany found themselves ready to believe the worst 
about their enemy. 
  Chauvinistic interpretations of Waterloo were the inverse of the memory of its heroes. 
Whereas a commentator such as Fitchett or Kämpfe peered back to 1815 to see a martial display 
of the finest national characteristics, this iteration of memory would require the use of 1815 as a 
venue to exhibit the enemy’s vile nature. This differed slightly from war historicism because it 
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tended to portray its villains as static figures interchangeable with the present instead of part of 
an evolutionary process. This variant of memory also used 1815 to degrade the present enemy. 
The Battle of Waterloo became an important metaphor; it would either be a symbol of the most 
atavistic nature of the enemy, or a yardstick from which to gauge the foe’s current inadequacies. 
If the memory Waterloo was to remain viable in this environment it would become necessary to 
denigrate the other. The ultimate purpose of this disparagement would be to remove any glory 
from the rival’s historical participation in Waterloo. 
 One curious example of this iteration of memory was when both nations engaged in a 
loose dialogue with each other around a curious rumor about the Lion’s Mound at Waterloo. The 
Times reported that 1,500 German soldiers were at work to dismantle the 31-ton bronze lion atop 
one of the most prominent landmarks of the battlefield, the massive artificial earth embankment 
erected to honor the Prince of Orange in 1820.208 The article cited an anonymous source for this 
story and treated it as a straightforward example of German destruction of Belgian monuments 
such as the destruction of Louvain the year before. In reality, the Lion’s Mound remained intact 
during the war and the The Times story has all the symptoms of typical wartime atrocity rumor. 
Such accounts frequently combined an unsubstantiated report from a few witnesses with a strong 
tendency to believe in the enemy’s worst instincts.209 Rather than let this bit of wartime gossip 
lie fallow, the German magazine Jugend published a comedic retort to this British atrocity story. 
After reassuring its readers that the story is false, the magazine published a poem “Der Löwe von 
Waterloo” by A. D. Nora wherein the lion itself had abandoned the field due to the behavior of 
the British: 
  When he saw Wellington’s heirs allied [with the French] 
  Murderously full of hate and anger 
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 towards the grandchildren of Blücher’s 
 German blood, the Germanic blood of 
 The noble lion seized 
 Such loathing of today 
 That he tucked in his tail  
 And with animalistic haste 
 Descended from its heights 
 And no one knows whither he fled 
 Yes, that I could understand well 
 Poor Lion of Waterloo!210 
 
Although comedic in tone, the poem insinuated British malfeasance when they elected to side 
with the French. The lion’s disgust with this choice amounted to an assertion by A. D. Nora that 
contemporary Britons had relinquished their birthright to the battle. 
 British chauvinism frequently clustered around historical accounts that postulated a 
German responsibility for Napoleon’s return because of an unchecked “Teutonic” instinct for 
revenge and destruction. The Times article “A New France” summarized the complex period of 
1814-15 as one in which both Wellington and the Russian Tsar Alexander II tried in vain to 
support the Bourbon monarchy. “Clearly this could not have been done had the clamor of the 
Prussians for vengeance and of the German princelings generally for ‘compensations’ been 
listened to,” according to The Times’s presentation of history.211 The return of Napoleon was 
only a matter of time because the Prussians, Bavarians, and Austrians each tried to humiliate a 
proud nation despite the best efforts of Wellington’s statesmanship. Not only did “A New 
France” give its readers a vision of a proto-Entente; but it also argued that there existed a 
precursor to the Central Powers. The main difference between the two was that the former, as 
exemplified by Wellington and Alexander II, were models of a nationally-minded chivalry, 
whereas avarice and a brutal desire for reprisals characterized their German counterpart.  
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William Henry Skaggs also utilized a vision of this proto-Central Powers in his screed German 
Conspiracies in America, From an American Point of View. He noted that “Wellington had no 
illusion as to the character of his allies… and [was] scrupulous to respect the rights of non-
combatants, as the bad men of his armies learned to their cost; and the disregard of these rights 
by the Germans revolted him.”212 Skaggs located these atrocities within a typical form of 
German warfare, which from the Thirty Years’ War all the way through to their current 
depredations in Belgium had consistently failed to respect culture and the rights of 
noncombatants.   
 A related trait of British chauvinism was to argue that the ego and militarism of Napoleon 
found new life in Wilhelm II, albeit without his predecessor’s genius or supported by the noble 
chivalry of French armies.  The popular historian J. Holland Rose would articulate this vision in 
a series of centennial-themed articles in The Centemporary Review. “Their imitation of 
Napoleon's harshness,” according Rose, “has led to brutalities as stupid as they are revolting. 
Finally, while pressing on his plans for domination with scientific thoroughness in the 
mechanical sphere, they have utterly failed in inspiring the sentiments of admiration and regard 
which alone can bind together a World-Empire.”213 Wilhelm II’s world strategy mimicked 
Napoleon in the sense that he tried to strike out at all sides to gain world domination, but only 
succeeded in creating a vast coalition against him. Rose reassured his readers that this world-
empire would fail like the last one. “The year 1915, as in the year 1815, will decide whether an 
imperialist militarism, endowed with superb resources in men and material, shall prevail over the 
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nationalist aspirations which have been the glory of the nineteenth century,” Rose concluded.214  
When coupled with the previous accounts of German tendencies towards violence in 1815, the 
result is a picture of a childish people that do not understand the full gravity of warfare as the 
British.  
 German historians would respond to this denigration by asserting that the British 
historical profession had engaged in a loose conspiracy to defame the German history. Karl 
Bleibtreu sought to document in voluminous detail the biases and deceptions in which British 
and French historians have engaged in over a century to defame Blücher. “The world is cheated 
and the ink blushes, when the English clergyman Fitchett calls Wellington’s war in the Peninsula 
the noblest fight for freedom against military despotism…England fought simply for its trade 
monopoly,” Bleibtreu wrote.215 Building on the work of German historians, Bleibtreu asserted 
that the British duplicity in erasing the German contribution at Waterloo started with Wellington 
and continued through to the twentieth century. Ernst Reventlow’s Der Vampir des Festlandes 
also argued that British historians have cloaked their nation’s blatant strategic objectives within a 
language of liberty and freedom. As soon as Prussia had secured the Allied victory at Waterloo, 
then Britain sided with France at the Vienna Congress to help fortify its trade gains by 
preventing the ascent of a strong Germany.216 In the case of both Bleibtreu and Reventlow, the 
dominance of British-led historiography obscured the Germans’ understanding of their own 
history. It was only with the start of hostilities that the mask came off of Britain’s self-centered 
historiography.  
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 Perhaps one of the most creative uses of chauvinism was The Crimes of England by 
Gilbert Keith Chesterton. This author fell into the radical tradition of British politics that held 
that the defeat of the French Revolution was a historical mistake detrimental to the development 
of democracy. Chesterton’s pro-war treatise argued that the French Revolutionary Era “first, last, 
and forever, was a duel between the Frenchman and the German; that is, between the citizen and 
the barbarian.”217 Britain’s involvement against France was the result of a British archaic social 
order unable to comprehend the French Revolution’s transformation of humans from subjects 
into citizens. Britain’s “crime” in this era was to ally itself with the barbaric German resistance 
to the progress of the French Revolution. Referencing Maclise’s painting, Chesterton argued that 
the victory over Waterloo was a tragic error. “Our middle classes did well to adorn their parlors 
with the picture of the Meeting of Wellington and Blücher. They should have hung up a 
companion piece of Pilate and Herod shaking hands,” he concluded.218 Only through the 
recognition of the baleful influence of Germanic culture, the treatise concluded, could the current 
war restore the progress of humanity begun in 1789. 
 Chesterton’s rather original use of chauvinism should serve as a reminder that this form 
of historical memory was not limited to the right-wing during this period. Nor was chauvinism a 
necessary result of patriotic memory. Scherenburg’s nationalist epic dismissed the controversy 
over the battle’s name by making his Blücher say the line “The battle is named Waterloo, The 
victory Belle-Alliance/ The day can support more than one name!”219 Yet in the context of 
wartime such largesse was rare. The attempts to use historical memory of Waterloo to denigrate 
and despise the other proved too irresistible in a milieu where the national risks of an incorrect 
version of history were so high. 
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FOURTH ITERATION: COMMEMORATION OF THE 1815 DEAD 
  Although the Napoleonic Wars marked some of the first attempts for a nationally-
orientated commemoration of the war dead, the First World War presented European societies 
with a number of war dead on an unprecedented scale. Public announcements of the dead, 
although carefully regulated by the state, became a part of the wartime’s daily routine. Thomas 
Laqueur contends that January 1915 was a paradigm shift in which “a new era of remembrance 
began: the era of the common soldier’s name or its self-conscious and sacralized oblivion.”220 
Although perhaps a bit hyperbolic, the general contours of Laquer’s assessment are correct in 
that the war dead became collective symbols of the nation due to the death of millions of young 
men. Jay Winter notes that the places memorializing the dead acted as sites of a “fictive kinship” 
that could transcend social boundaries as people honored the dead.221 In both Germany and 
Britain the fourth iteration of the memory of Waterloo became an important bridge for this 
process. 
 Because wartime events had forced the cancellation of parades and celebratory 
reenactments of Waterloo, both Britons and Germans had to devise creative means to mark the 
occasion of the centennial. Aside from war historicism, hero worship, or chauvinism, one avenue 
for the memory of Waterloo to manifest itself was in the celebration of the dead of 1815.This 
was especially prominent in Britain where there was no access to the battlefield itself. The 
German variant proceeded along slightly different lines since the German state developed which 
favored a local interpretation of history. Although small-scale in both countries, this form of 
remembrance illustrates this development of the larger scale processes of remembrance. 
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 Two weeks prior to the centennial, the Royal Artillery elected to honor the graves of its 
Waterloo fallen. Eventually they found forty-one graves and placed a small wreath on them.222 
At a Waterloo Day luncheon in Woolwich the Royal Artillery officers present marked the event 
with a quiet remembrance. According to a publication put out by the Royal Artillery, the officers  
were asked to “honor the names and memories of Artilleryman of all ranks, who fought at 
Waterloo and to remember those men of today who are fighting with the same bravery as our 
men of 1815.”223 At Wellington College, annual Waterloo Day Banquet, originally funded by a 
subscription from Wellington himself, had been cancelled in lieu of a memorial service for the 
alumni killed in the current conflict. The Times reported that before the ceremony, the current 
Duke of Wellington planted an acorn taken from the grave of Copenhagen, Wellington’s famous 
horse.224 Both the Wellington College ceremony and that of the Royal Artillery prefigured that of 
the postwar commemorations of the war which involve gestures and solemnity to properly honor 
the dead. 
  In the context of the entente, one of the more obvious ways to simultaneously 
memorialize Waterloo and serve the war effort was to stage commemorations of the battle as 
symbols of international reconciliation with France. For example, on the June anniversary 
witnessed The Times recorded several instances of reconciliation on both a state and private 
level. In Paris, the oldest British residents “placed a wreath in the new cemetery at Neuilly- sur-
Seine, where lie many French and British soldiers who fought and fell in the Battle of the 
Marne.” The London authorities placed a heart-shaped ivy wreath, wrapped with a tricoleur 
ribbon, around Wellington’s equestrian statue in Hyde Park. Paris matched this courtesy by 
attaching bouquets of red, white, and blue carnations around the wax statues of Napoleon and 
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Wellington in Madame Tussard’s museum.225 Furthermore, the centenary memory would 
develop further the idea that Waterloo represented a titanic military struggle between two equals. 
A Times editorial stated that: 
 To remember [Waterloo] is to praise [French] qualities; for we should recall this victory 
 with less pride had it been gained over an army less glorious and a captain less renowned; 
 and for all our appreciation of- Wellington’s genius and of the courage and tenacity of 
 our soldiers, we know well how easily victory might have been turned into defeat had not 
 Napoleon's good fortune deserted him on the field of battle.226   
 
Although these ceremonies had a clear wartime goal of expressing solidarity, the also presage 
one of the critical developments in twentieth century diplomacy in which nations once on 
opposing sides honor the war dead of their former enemies, such as Ronald Reagan and Helmut 
Kohl’s 1985 visit to Bitburg cemetery to observe the fortieth anniversary of V-E day. Although 
small scale and with under the duress of wartime, these ceremonies of Waterloo marked the start 
of the modern war commemoration. 
 In the case of Germany, the manifestation of this memory was far more discreet and 
involved the concept of the Heimat (Homeland). This popular genre evolved as an alternative to 
the Kaiserreich’s Hohenzollern-centered nationalism, Heimat posited a German identity rooted 
in the local German countryside. In Confino’s formulation “the Heimat image was democratic 
and equal, not in the sense of legal and political rights, but because it was an image of Germany 
that excluded no one, and, in theory at least, included all.”227 One of the Heimat journals the 
Niedersachsen bimonthly published a special centennial issue. The expressed hope of this issue’s 
editor was the erection of a worthy monument for the King’s German Legion will be erected in 
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Hannover when the chance of an honorable peace is near.228 This issue celebrated the heroes of 
Lower Saxony, including luminaries like Duke Frederick William and the general Christian von 
Ompteda, but the issue also delved into the life of the ordinary soldier as well. For example, the 
issue reproduced the silhouette of sergeant in a minor militia battalion.229 Although not 
completely free of the wartime-era bombast, the commemorative issue reproduced many of the 
existing monuments and gravesites of the Lower Saxon Waterloo heroes, thus grounding the 
memory into local culture. The issue closed with a use of commemorative memory that drew an 
indirect but distinct comparison to the current wartime environment: a list of the dead and 
wounded officers from Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, arranged by unit, rank, and name.230 In this 
circuitous way, this Heimat-centered centennial of Waterloo draws upon the power of the dead 
by recreating a more modern form of remembrance. 
  The problem with this instrumentalized memory was that the actual course of the war 
from 1915 onwards directly contradicted what Waterloo’s ostensible historical lessons predicted: 
battles were indecisive, generals did not directly sway the outcome, and individual courage 
counted for little in an industrial total war. This highly constructed form of memory, 
accentuating earlier exercises in memorialization of the battle, was inherently unstable because 
of the realities of wartime experience of 1914-18. In a strange twist, the First World War came to 
resemble a distorted mirror of Napoleonic Wars in both nations’ popular conceptions. For 
example, the stoic and formal leadership exemplified by BEF commander Douglas Haig, bear a 
striking resemblance to earlier depictions of Wellington, but Haig’s generalship became 
emblematic of an unimaginative commander who cared little for the welfare of his troops. 
                                                     
228
 Fritz Goebel, “1815- 18. Juni- 1915,” Niedersachsen: Illustrierte Halbmonatschrifte für Geschichte und 
Famliensgeschichte, Landes und Volkeskunde, Sprache, Kunst, und Literatur Niedersachsens 20,  no 18 (15 June, 
1915): 283.  
229
 Anonymous, “La Haye Saint” in Ibid., 301. 
230
 Anonymous, “Namenliste,” in Ibid., 304-306. 
110 
 
Although Hindenburg was able to develop an unparalleled cult of personality during the First 
World War, that did not translate into victory. First World War battles such as the Somme or 
Verdun offensives were similar to depictions of Waterloo in that they represented a meticulous 
match between clockwork efficiency and geographic maneuvering, but were ultimately quixotic 
endeavors. Finally, the British popular memory of the trenches emphasized the pluck and 
courage of the common soldier, but this trope stressed a tragic sacrifice verging on the senseless 
rather than a heroic one. German memory of the veteran diverged to emphasize the industrial 
fighter as exemplified in Ernst Jünger’s writings, but the German cult of the fallen soldier could 
fuse the concept of Heimat to chauvinism with potentially fatal results.  
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CONCLUSION 
THE FADING MEMORY OF WATERLOO 
This is not simply a question of national pride or regimental commemoration. It is about saving a 
fundamental part of world history, and we simply must not fail.231 
 As Waterloo approaches its bicentennial, the stone chateau of Hougoumont is in a serious 
state of disrepair. According to Project Hougoumont’s chairman Richard Holmes, the 
multinational charity tasked to preserve the building, the walls of the farm are crumbling and 
despite previous preservation work, the site looks like “increasingly like a half–forgotten rural 
building site.”232 The charity’s website makes it explicitly clear that it seeks to preserve 
Hougoumont to sustain the legacy of all Waterloo’s combatants for the sake of a global heritage. 
Furthermore, the site will honor the British, German, Dutch-Belgian, and French soldiers who 
fought and died. This desire to preserve a site of memory encapsulates how Waterloo has 
evolved into an uneasy twilight memory. Its remaining cultural power simultaneously spans both 
national and international realms of identity but lingers on the verge of being forgotten.    
 British memory of Waterloo proved to be the most lasting after 1915. The British had of 
course invested a considerable amount of time and effort in cultivating a national memory of the 
battle and its commander over the nineteenth century. In this case the strength of Waterloo’s 
memory was that it had a fully-developed cultural legacy upon which to base post-First World 
War depictions of the battle and its commanders. Wellington himself became the protagonist of 
the 1934 film The Iron Duke where he managed to save Europe from Napoleon despite the 
hindrance of unscrupulous politicians. Yet in this new age of mass communications, 
Wellington’s stern demeanor and pedestrian love life did not make him a particularly cinematic 
hero, especially when compared to his other Napoleonic Era rival Horatio Nelson. The Iron Duke 
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had to embellish Wellington’s political war by adding a femme fatale antagonist in the form of 
Louis XVIII’s niece. Depictions of Trafalgar gradually displaced Waterloo in British cinema; 
naval battles were not only easier for British filmmakers to shoot, but the Atlantic-centered 
metaphor of a Royal Navy hemming in an aspiring hegemon had more relevance after the 
Second World War. Spectacular depictions of Waterloo itself no longer possessed the iconic 
draw that they once enjoyed in the nineteenth century. Waterloo, a 1970 film produced by Dino 
De Laurentiis, featured a cast of thousands and included an epic staging of the Scot’s Greys 
charge directly lifted from Lady Butler’s painting. The Wellington in the film is a model military 
commander concerned with both victory and the welfare of his troops, while Napoleon 
prefigures Hitler whenever he berates his marshals for their lack of faith in final victory. Despite 
the film’s ambitious scale and seeming relevance, it was both a critical and commercial failure. 
 Margaret Thatcher tried to reinvest some of the power and prestige of Waterloo and 
Wellington during her tenure as Prime Minister by prominently displaying portraits of 
Wellington and Nelson in both 10 Downing Street and her personal residence.233 This was a sign 
of Thatcher’s anachronistic politics that was culturally out of line with the trajectory of British 
society. More in line with Britain’s post-nationalist environment were the bicentennial 
celebrations of Trafalgar. Although the spectacle of a naval review proved highly popular, the 
mock battle between the Franco-Spanish and British fleets were politically renamed the “red” 
and “blue” fleets to avoid any untoward jingoism.  
 In the British context, Waterloo is not so much forgotten as it is misremembered in 
popular culture. The Swedish pop group ABBA’s first UK hit, the love song “Waterloo” first 
stanzas contain a highly inaccurate version of Waterloo: My, my, at Waterloo Napoleon did 
surrender/ Oh yeah, and I have met my/ destiny in quite a similar way/ The history book on the 
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shelf/Is always repeating itself.234 Not only is ABBA’s song historically inaccurate with regards 
to Napoleon’s “surrender”, but it reinforces the popular canard that history repeats itself 
therefore there is nothing to learn from it. In a similar vein, the Rowan Atkinson’s 1999 comedy 
Blackadder: Back & Forth has its roguish protagonist Edmund Blackadder accidently killing 
Wellington before Waterloo when he travels back in time to steal the Duke’s eponymous boots. 
To Blackadder’s chagrin, when he returns back to Britain, he finds out that France has ruled the 
island for nearly two centuries. As absurd as these two examples of Waterloo memory are, it is 
likely that they have received far more public attention than the vastly more historically-minded 
Project Hougoumont. Furthermore, both the ABBA song and the Blackadder film do 
acknowledge the historical tropes of Waterloo first encoded during the nineteenth century: 
Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and Wellington was the chief British commander. Even 
Blackadder’s Gallic dystopia is a manifestation of the idea developed as far back as Astley’s 
Amphitheater that all that stood between Napoleon and domination of Europe was the Duke and 
his band of men.       
 While popular British memory of Waterloo since 1915 has receded into dimly 
remembered lessons of history, German memory of Waterloo and the Befreiungskriege has 
followed a more politically charged path. The Kaiserreich’s Prussian-centered narrative of 
Waterloo found itself reeling from the dual blows of defeat in war and the Weimar Republic’s 
hostility any memory exalting the monarchical regime. The old regime’s heroes and myths found 
themselves now enlisted by Germany’s populist far-right parties such as the Deutschnationale 
Volkspartei (DVNP) or the National Socialists. Hitler’s dictatorship proceeded to use this 
memory to exalt the regime along similar patterns as its monarchical predecessor but with subtle 
differences. As Robert Gerwarth observed in his study on the use of Bismarck’s memory, the 
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National Socialist state was very leery of exalting any potential historical rivals.235 In the case of 
the Napoleonic Era, the state tried to rework men such as Blücher or Gneisenau into prototypes 
of an ideal National Socialist. For example, Josef Goebbels’s 1943 film Kolburg depicted the 
town’s 1806 siege by the French through the lens of Nazi ideology where its population gleefully 
mobilizes for a total war and eschews love and family for the security of the Fatherland.  Other 
methods of commemoration served to explicitly serve needs of the state. The heavy cruiser 
Blücher and battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau may have been the regime’s monuments 
to Germans of the Napoleonic Era, but the ships were also clear indicators of the state’s 
rearmament and military power.     
 The end of the Nazi state resulted in a bifurcated memory of this era and its battles. 
Mustafa notes that in the Federal Republic of Germany “did simply foreswear militarism; they 
generally avoided the study of most military topics.”236 Ironically, even though the Red Army 
destroyed Blücher’s East Prussian crypt as a symbol of German militarism, the memory of 
Blücher and the Befreiungskriege became an important one to the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR). GDR General Secretary Walter Ulbricht held a mass rally which rededicated the 
Völkerschlachtdenkmal in 18 October 1953 complete with patriotic speeches extolling the true 
heroes of German history, a mass parade of Communist youth, ceremonies honoring the Russian 
1813 dead, and fireworks.237 Much like its imperial predecessor, the GDR sought to claim a vital 
link between German heroes of the past and the current regime. The GDR also struck several 
hundred Blücher Orders. These medals were to be the highest award given to GDR’s 
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Nationalvolksarmee (NVA) in the event of a war with NATO.238 Fortunately the NVA did not 
have to emulate Blücher’s 1814 drive towards the Rhine and the GDR never issued the medals 
before its dissolution.  
 German reunification ended this Wilhelm II-like state relationship with the 
Befreiungskriege. In a stark inverse of educational trends of nineteenth century textbooks, most 
German history textbooks pay scant attention to the Napoleonic Era and even laud the 
progressive features of Napoleonic rule such as secularization, a common European vision, and 
the emancipation of Jews.239 In this new German constellation of memory, there seems little 
room for Germany’s contribution to Waterloo. Even the recent “Prusso-mania” which celebrates 
Germany’s Prussian past avoids militaristic topics, preferring to highlight Prussia’s historical 
contribution to humanistic culture and the Enlightenment. For example, in 2010 Charlottenburg 
Palace held an exhibition to honor the deceased heroine of Mühlbach’s Napoleon and Blücher, 
Queen Louise. Called “Miss Prussia 2010” and advertised with posters such as “It Girl,” 
“Working Mom” and “Fashion Victim,” the exhibition tries to get at the heart of Queen Louisa 
the mother and wife and the public image of her crafted both during and after her life.240 The 
exhibition depicts her role in the resistance to Napoleon as only one dimension to her life. 
 As the twentieth-first century seems to confirm how much little remains of the memory 
of Waterloo it is tempting to see this fading memory as confirmation of both Germany and 
Britain’s rejection of highly narcissistic nationalism. With few exceptions, many of the 
portrayals of Waterloo such as Scherenburg’s poetry or Henty’s fiction do not stand up the 
criterion of even decent art. Constance Cain Hungerford summed up this pejorative mode of 
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dismissal exceptionally well in his examination of the nineteenth-century French military painter 
Ernest Meissonier: 
 Meissonier represents the polar opposite of the heroes of the canon: repetitiveness and 
 sterility, rather than originality; craft and the literal imitation of material appearances, 
 rather than nature viewed through a temperament, stylized, abstracted; modest and highly 
 marketable, rather than defiantly public scale; refined and historicizing subjects, rather 
 than the rude and the contemporary; the patronage of the rich, powerful, and 
 conventional, rather than those congratulated for venturesome taste; and affirmation of 
 politically conservative values like prosperity, militarism, and patriotism, rather than 
 destabilizing analysis of social norms. 241 
 
There is much truth to this analysis, but there was more to this mobilization of memory than a 
narrowly-defined economic and political class seeking to mentally perpetuate their cultural 
hegemony in a highly self-congratulatory fashion.  
 The people described in this study lived in a time of immense change. Historical memory 
of Waterloo was one way they could understand their own identity in such an era. The 
Napoleonic Wars affected the whole of Europe beyond just military occupation, as seen in this 
thesis it had an effect upon European culture long after Napoleon’s exile in Saint Helena. 
Memory was one way to orientate the individual in such a confluence. For example, Ludwig I’s 
obsession with dates and symbols of liberation from France reflect a man trying to master the 
past rather than being mastered by it. Even if this memory manifested itself in an archaic quasi-
medieval nationalism as in the case of Ludwig I, it still represents an effort of a human being to 
locate his own place in the world. Although this tenuous teleology grew more unstable as the 
centennial approached, its use even during the First World War illustrates the grip this unsteady 
memory still held.   
 The importance of Waterloo is that as a site of memory the battle still has some resonance 
in the twilight of its relationship with the European public. Not even historians are immune to 
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this process. One of the consequences of a century-long mental refighting of Waterloo by 
Germans and Britons was to firmly cement the year 1815 as an epochal turning point in 
European history along with such years as 1648, 1789, and 1914. Starting in 1976, one of the 
most ambitious collections of nineteenth-century British periodicals appropriately chose the 
name Waterloo Directory of English Periodicals and Newspapers, 1800-1900. By recognizing 
memory as a historical process integrally related to its parent society and analyzing its evolution, 
historians can unravel the complex maze people wrap around themselves when constructing a 
national identity. While acknowledging the potentially baleful influences of this process, 
historians should also see memory as a fundamental aspect of humanity’s relationship to its past.    
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